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Decisions are prone to bias. This can be seen in daily choices. For instance, when the 
markets are plunging, investors tend to sell stocks instead of purchasing them with lower 
prices because people in general are more sensitive to the potential losses than the 
potential gains, or loss averse, in making financial choices. This also can be seen in 
laboratory tests. When participants receive higher payoffs for successfully discriminating 
a visual stimulus as one choice against the other, they begin choosing this higher-
rewarded option more often even though the objective evidence indicates the alternative. 
In my dissertation, I used mathematical models and functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) to track the development of bias in perceptual and financial decision-
making and presented evidence characterizing the experience-sensitive and domain-
general decision-making process in the human brains. The first chapter showed that bias 
could be developed through associating decision contexts and reward feedback from trial 
to trial in perceptual decision-making. Although the surface task differed, this learning 
process involved the same prediction error driven mechanisms implemented in the 
dopaminergic system as in financial decision-making. Furthermore, the frontal cortex 
increased its strength of connection between visual and value systems that accounted for 
vi 
the growth of perceptual bias. The second chapter extended this feedback-driven 
acquisition process to examine the influences of experience on loss aversion in financial 
decision-making. The results showed that people learned to make riskier or more 
conservative decisions according to the feedback that they had received in different 
decision contexts. This alternation in loss aversion was achieved through modulation of 
the value system’s sensitivity toward the potential gains in evaluation. The frontal cortex 
mediated this change. The third chapter used a mathematical model to identify the 
changes in financial decision-making that occurred faster than the temporal resolution of 
fMRI. The results suggested that people might simplify financial information into some 
rules of thumb for making a choice. These findings not only integrated the knowledge in 
different domains of decision neuroscience but also shed lights onto how one may refine 
the decision-making process against experiences. 
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1 
Introduction 
Decisions are susceptible to bias. This is commonly seen in choices that people 
make on daily basis. For instance, it has been shown that if investors could abide by their 
financial plan, they would have gained more returns from the markets. However, since 
the potential losses have greater psychological impact than the potential gains, people 
tend to deviate from their plan by purchasing stocks when the markets roar and selling 
them when the markets plunge. Biased decisions are also ubiquitously observed across 
species when tested in laboratory settings. One easy way to demonstrate how much 
choices can depart from the objective evidence presenting in front of a decision maker is 
using perceptual discrimination tasks. When participants receive higher payoffs for 
successfully discriminating a visual stimulus as one choice against the other, they begin 
choosing this higher-rewarded option more often even though the visual stimulus 
indicates the alternative.  
 
For decades, research into the neural mechanisms that process objective decision 
evidence and those that contribute to biases in decision-making has proceeded in parallel 
domains with limited crosstalk. Specifically, the literature on perceptual decisions has 
focused on how an individual’s choices are influenced by the quality of sensory evidence, 
such as brightness, motion strength, vibration…etc. On the other hand, the literature on 
economic decisions has emphasized how individuals develop preferential choices from 
previous choice outcomes (Glimcher 2011; Lee, Seo, and Jung 2012; Montague and 
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Berns 2002). Recently, converging evidence from animal physiology (Ding and Gold 
2013) and human neuroimaging (Summerfield and Tsetsos 2012) has motivated a call to 
investigate behavior that links these two factors—evidence and experience—in order to 
identify the domain-general decision-making processes in the brain.  
 
The goal of my dissertation is to offer an integrated view of decision-making 
process in the human brains by tracing the development of bias in different domains of 
decision-making. To achieve this goal, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
and mathematical models were used to synthesize data collected from seemly different 
behavioral tasks into a common framework. The details of these studies and findings 
were reported in three chapters. In Chapter 1, I used a perceptual discrimination task to 
test the hypothesis that the reward feedback from trial to trial contributed to bias in 
perceptual decisions and that this development involved the reinforcement learning 
mechanism implemented in dopaminergic systems as shown in economic decision-
making. In Chapter 2, I examined the influence of choice feedback on a common bias in 
financial decision-making process--loss aversion. I tested the hypothesis that pairing 
decision contexts and feedback could alter loss aversion and that this adjustment was 
achieved by tuning the interaction between cognitive control and value systems. In 
Chapter 3, I developed a mathematical model to identify the experience-induced changes 
in financial decision-making in order to characterize those changes in the decision-
making process that were beyond the limited temporal resolution of the functional brain 
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imaging technique. This complimented the findings in Chapter 2. Overall, these findings 
not only bridge the literature gap between different domains of decision neuroscience but 
also provide insights into how one may refine daily choices in the face of experiences. 
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Chapter 1: Multiple brain networks contribute to the acquisition of bias 
in perceptual decision-making 
INTRODUCTION 
Decisions are driven both by the objective evidence presented to an individual 
and by the outcomes that the individual has learned to expect from the past. For decades, 
research in the neural mechanisms that processes each of the two factors in decision-
making has proceeded in parallel with very little crosstalk. The literature on perceptual 
decisions has focused on how an individual’s choices are influenced by the quality of 
sensory evidence, whereas the literature on economic decisions has emphasized how an 
individual’s choices are driven by the expected reward arising from previous choice 
outcomes (Glimcher 2011; Lee, Seo, and Jung 2012; Montague and Berns 2002). 
Recently, converging evidence from animal physiology (Ding and Gold 2013) and human 
neuroimaging (Summerfield and Tsetsos 2012) has motivated a call to investigate 
behavior that links these two factors in order to identify the general neural mechanisms of 
decision-making processes across domains. Reward-induced bias in perceptual decisions 
(Edwards 1965; Green and Swets 1966) is a phenomenon that sits exactly at this literature 
gap. Investigating the neural mechanisms underlying such bias hence will provide an 
integrated view of decision-making processes in the brain. 
 
Expected reward has a profound influence on perceptual decisions. When 
prompted to classify sensory information as one of the two alternatives offering 
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asymmetric payoffs, both humans and animals tend to prefer the higher-rewarded 
alternative (Feng, Holmes, Rorie, and Newsome 2009; Fleming, Whiteley, Hulme, 
Sahani, and Dolan 2010; Liston and Stone 2008; Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, 
and Forstmann 2012; Rorie, Gao, McClelland, and Newsome 2010; Summerfield and 
Koechlin 2010; Whiteley and Sahani 2008). At the behavioral level, this choice 
preference can be identified from the sigmoidal relationship between the strength of 
sensory evidence and the probability of choosing one of the alternatives, or psychometric 
function. The amount of bias is quantified as the horizontal shift of the indecision point in 
the psychometric function (Gold and Ding 2013; Green and Swets 1966; Macmillan and 
Creelman 2004). The choice preference also can be characterized by reaction time since 
the biased choices usually are made faster (Mulder et al. 2012; Summerfield and 
Koechlin 2010). Drift-diffusion modeling of the choices and reaction times suggests that 
information about reward generally affects the early stage of decision process (Mulder et 
al. 2012; Summerfield and Koechlin 2010; but see Blank, Biele, Heekeren, and 
Philiastides 2013 for alternatives), so that less sensory evidence is required to be 
accumulated in order to support the more beneficial option.  
 
In contrast to the well-established theoretical and empirical work at the 
behavioral level, the neural mechanisms by which reward information contributes to bias 
in perceptual decisions remain an open question. Specifically, it remains unclear how the 
expectation of reward is formed in a neural system during perceptual decisions and once 
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formed, how this reward information influences different neural components of the 
perceptual decision process. One possibility is that reward information is formed as a 
task-set (Summerfield, Egner, Mangels, and Hirsch 2006) in the higher level (i.e. frontal 
and parietal cortices) of the perceptual decision hierarchy. It then selectively influences 
the sensory and motor system to facilitate the choice of higher-rewarded options (Duncan 
2001; Liston and Stone 2008). However, this account is only partially supported by 
evidence from human functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). After human 
participants receive explicit instructions for the payoffs of each perceptual choice, the 
activation of fronto-parietal cortices positively correlates with the amount of bias in their 
perceptual decisions (Fleming et al. 2010; Mulder et al. 2012; Summerfield and Koechlin 
2010). Yet, the correlation between perceptual bias and activation in sensory or motor 
cortices is inconsistent across studies (Fleming et al. 2010; Mulder et al. 2012; 
Summerfield and Koechlin 2010; Serences 2008).  
 
Another possibility is that bias in perceptual decisions reflects the subjective 
value that is learned from the previous choice outcomes. Evidence shows that as macaque 
monkeys developed a bias toward the higher-rewarded options in a motion discrimination 
task, the firing-rate of midbrain dopaminergic neurons increased when the animals 
received greater reward for correctly identifying the motion direction, and decreased 
when reward was absent after an incorrect choice (Nomoto, Schultz, Watanabe, and 
Sakagami 2010). This activation pattern is analogous to a reinforcement learning signal 
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(Schultz 1998; Sutton and Barto 1998) in which the difference between the expected and 
actual choice outcomes (reward prediction error, RPE) is used to update the subjective 
value of each option, which is putatively encoded in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) (Bartra, McGuire, and Kable 2013; Garrison, Erdeniz, and Done 2013; 
Glimcher 2011; Montague and Berns 2002). The value difference between each option 
hence determines which options are worth repeating in the future (Lee et al. 2012). This 
observation has inspired theoretical work that combines drift-diffusion and reinforcement 
learning models to simulate the potential interaction between cortical and basal ganglia in 
the development of perceptual bias (Bogacz and Larsan 2011; Rao 2010). Nevertheless, 
until now, no empirical study has directly investigated this reinforcement-learning 
mechanism and its influence on different decision-making networks at the level of the 
whole-brain when individuals acquire perceptual bias.  
 
 In the present study, we approach these issues by tracking how humans 
developed bias in perceptual decisions using computational models and functional brain 
imaging. During fMRI acquisition, participants performed a motion discrimination task 
(Britten, Shadlen, Newsome, and Movshon 1993; Newsome, Britten, and Movshon 1989; 
Shadlen and Newsome 2001) with pre-trial cues signaling one of two different reward 
contexts. Trial-wise reward feedback was delivered to participants so that a correct 
response to one of the motion directions was reinforced more strongly in each reward 
context. To maximize reward, the subject must combine information about the stimulus 
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and the potential reward, such that predicted reward exerts a greater effect on choices 
when the stimulus is weak. As the experiment proceeded, the indecision point of 
perceptual choices gradually shifted when it was measured in different reward contexts. 
This shift was quantified using a reinforcement-learning model that estimated the 
subjective value of each option according to the association of reward prediction error 
(RPE) and the reward contexts (Watkins and Dayan 1992). Consistent with a role for 
value learning mechanisms, the RPE signals associated with the acquisition of perceptual 
bias positively correlated with the activation of ventral striatum, dlPFC, and parietal 
cortex. As the bias grows, we find that the value signals integrate into perceptual decision 
network through increasing functional connectivity in networks involved in motor 
preparation (vmPFC-motor cortex), stimulus evaluation (frontal-vmPFC-visual cortex), 
and cognitive control (parietal-anterior cingulate cortex [ACC]). These results enhance 
our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying bias acquisition, and provide a 
fundamental linkage between the perceptual and economic decision-making processes in 
the brain. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-four human participants completed the behavioral paradigm in the MRI 
scanner (12 females, 12 males; age range: 18 - 30). One participant was excluded because 
of extreme parameter estimates in the fMRI data analysis. All participants were recruited 
through posted flyers and were prescreened. They were free of any self-reported 
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neurological or psychiatric diseases, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and 
normal color vision, and right-handed. They gave written informed consent for 
participation. The Institutional Review Board of the University of Texas at Austin 
approved all experimental procedures. 
Stimuli 
All stimuli were generated in Matlab version 7.10.0, using the Psychophysics 
Toolbox extension, version 3.0.10 (Brainard 1997; Pelli 1997). Each motion stimulus was 
composed of 150 white dots moving inside a donut-shaped display patch on a black 
background. The display patch was centered on the screen and extended from 4 to 8 
degrees of visual-angle. Within the display patch, every dot moved at the speed of 8 
degrees of visual-angle per second. Some dots moved coherently toward one direction 
while the others moved randomly. The percentage of coherently moving dots determined 
the motion strength (coherence level). The presentation of the dots was controlled to 
remove local motion signals (Britten et al. 1993; Newsome et al. 1989; Palmer, Huk, and 
Shadlen 2005; Shadlen and Newsome 2001). Upon stimulus onset, the dots were 
randomly located on the first three video frames. They were relocated after two 
subsequent frames, so that the dots in frame 1 were repositioned in frame 4, and the dots 
in frame 2 were repositioned in frame 5, etc.  When repositioned, each dot was either 
randomly presented at the new location or aligned with the pre-determined motion 
direction  (upward or downward), depending on the pre-determined motion strength on 
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that trial. Each stimulus was composed of 12 video frames with 60 Hz video frame 
refresh rates. 
Procedures and task 
Participants first performed a practice session in the laboratory to familiarize 
themselves with the random-dot motion discrimination task. In the practice session, a trial 
began with a red fixation cross that was presented at the center of the display screen for 
1.5s. Then, a patch of moving dots was presented for 200ms. After the stimulus offset, 
participants had to decide whether the global motion direction of these dots was upward 
or downward by pressing the corresponding spatially congruent buttons within 600ms. 
Error feedback was presented for 1.5s for incorrect or slow responses; otherwise, the next 
trial continued immediately with presentation of the fixation cross.  On each trial, the 
motion stimulus was a random sample from one of the 9 coherence levels (0%, ±6%, 
±12%, ±64%, ±80%; positive sign: upward motion, negative sign: downward motion). 
The correct response for 0% coherence trials was decided using a random number 
generator, so that the probability of being either correct or incorrect on this trial type was 
equal over the entire experiment. The total of 540 trials (9 coherence levels x 60 
repetition) was broken down into six 90-trial blocks. The participants could take a break 
after completing each block. 
 
The fMRI scan was conducted no more than 7 days after the practice session. In 
the scanner, participants were asked to decide the motion direction of moving-dots 
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presented in two independent reward contexts with a goal to get as many reward points as 
possible over the experiment. The task structure and the timeline of events on a trial are 
illustrated in Figure 1. Before a trial started, a white fixation-cross presented at the center 
of the display screen during the jittered inter-trial interval (truncated exponential 
distribution; mean:  4s, range 2.7 - 12.7s). At the beginning of a trial, the color of the 
fixation-cross changed into either blue or yellow for 1s to signal the reward context of the 
trial. Then, a motion stimulus was presented for 200ms. The participant had up to 800 ms 
from stimulus onset to decide the motion direction by pressing the corresponding button. 
After this 800-ms response window, a number appeared on the screen for 1.5s to inform 
the participant how many reward points that they earned from their decisions. The payoff 
of the two possible motion direction choices was associated with the reward contexts. In 
one context correct upward motion choices led to more reward points, whereas in the 
other state correct downward motion choices led to more reward points (Figure 1). The 
total reward points were converted into US dollar as bonus at the end of the experiment. 
The participants were unaware of this payoff structure before they began the task. They 
were simply instructed to decide the motion direction on each trial in order to harvest the 
most reward points.  
 
Several procedures were implemented in the experimental design in order to rule 
out other potential sources of decision bias rather than reward itself. First, each context 
was paired with equal numbers of trials in each motion direction and the same levels of 
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motion discriminability, which controlled the prior-induced bias (Green and Swets 1966). 
The motion stimulus was a random sample from one of 7 coherence levels (0%, ±4%, 
±12%, ±64%) on each trial. Every coherence level repeated 20 times within each state.  
The total 280 trials (2 reward contexts x 7 coherence levels x 20 repetition) were equally 
distributed in the 5 scanning runs for each participant. Moreover, the presentation of 
reward contexts were independent from trial to trial, which rules out the potential 
confound that participants used the sequential pattern to guide their choices (Daw, 
Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, and Dolan 2011; Glascher, Daw, Dayan, and O'Doherty 
2010). Finally, the response buttons and the colors of the fixation cross were counter-
balanced across participants in order to remove other potential confounds. The 
participants’ choice and the reaction time were recorded on each trial. 
Behavioral data analysis 
We applied the hierarchical logistic models to evaluate run-by-run changes of 
bias and discrimination, using the lme4 package (http://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html) in R Version 3.0.0 (http://www.r-
project.org/). The full model included five exploratory regressors: coherence-level, 
reward context, run-number, context-by-run, and coherence-by-run interaction. The 
intercept was taken as a random effect across participants. When testing the learning 
effects across the five scanning runs, we used a Chi-square test to compare the goodness-
of-fit of this full model against the model in which either of the interaction terms was 
reduced.  
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Furthermore, we applied computational models to capture the cross-correlation 
between the feedback on the previous trial and the choice on the next trial. We 
implemented two reinforcement-learning models with different hypotheses regarding 
how participants might use their experiences about contexts, choices, and rewards to 
develop biases in perceptual decision-making. In each case, a logit function was used to 
generate the probability of binary choices on every trial based on the reward each 
participant had received so far and the motion stimulus that was presented on the 
particular trial. The models are described in detail in the next section. Auto-correlation 
functions were computed from the residuals of the best-fit learning model at the group 
level using the acf function in R (Box, Jenkins, and Reinsel 1994; Pinheiro and Bates 
2009) to identify additional factors potentially missing in the model. 
Reinforcement learning models 
We assumed that on the 𝑡!! trial, an individual chose probabilistically 
according to the value difference of each motion direction (𝑄!(𝑚!); a binary variable i, 
respectively indicating the upward and downward motion) and the perceived motion 
strength. This relationship can be described by a logit function with the linear 
combination of the value difference between each motion direction and the perceived 
motion strength (Green and Swets 1966; Macmillan and Creelman 2004). Since the 
perceived motion strength was monotonic with the physical stimulus (Britten et al. 1993), 
we used the coherence level on trial t (𝑆!) to model the contribution of physical stimuli 
to the choice. The probability of choosing upward motion hence is: 
 
 
14 
 𝑃! 𝑚! =  1 {1+ exp [𝛽! ∗ 𝑄! 𝑚! −  𝑄! 𝑚! +  𝛽! ∗  𝑆!]}                  (1) 
 
where the 𝑏! and 𝑏! reflected how the choice probability was influenced by the 
subjective value difference and motion stimulus on the current trial respectively.  
  
The second part of the model was constructed to simulate how the trial-wise 
reward feedback was used to estimate the subjective value of each motion direction. Two 
Q-learning models (Watkins and Dayan 1992) were separately specified such that the 
reward prediction error (RPE) was used to update action value differently.  The RPE 
was used to updated the action value pertained to the context in one model and the action 
value regardless of context in the other model. 
 
On every trial, the context-dependent action value was adjusted by keeping track 
of the context in which a choice was made. The context-dependent RPE (𝛿!!) was 
computed as the difference between expected and the actual outcomes (𝑟!) followed by a 
choice made in the specific context. This error was scaled by a constant learning rate (𝛼!) 
and added into the value of each motion direction choice made in the same context before: 𝛿! =  𝑟! −  𝑄! 𝑚!  𝑐!),  𝑄!!! 𝑚!  𝑐!) =  𝑄! 𝑚!  𝑐!)+  𝛼! ∗  𝛿!!                                (2) 
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where 𝑐! and 𝑚! takes binary values respectively for indicating the context on trial t 
and the motion direction choice made in this context. 
 
A second model was constructed based on the assumption that context was 
ignored. In this case, the action value was adjusted by adding RPE (𝛿!), weighted by a 
constant learning rate (𝛼), to the value of each motion direction (𝑄!(𝑚!)), regardless of 
the contexts where the choice was made: 𝛿! =  𝑟! −  𝑄! 𝑚!  𝑄!!! 𝑚! = 𝑄! 𝑚! +  𝛼 ∗  𝛿!                                       (3) 
 
We used maximum likelihood method to obtain parameter estimates for each 
model. The likelihood that a sequence of choice and feedback (D) was generated by a set 
of free parameters (𝜃! ∈ {𝛽!, 𝛽!, 𝛼}) was the product of Equation 1 over the total trials 
(Daw, 2009): 𝑃 𝜃!   𝐷) ∝ 𝑃 𝐷  𝜃!) =  𝑃! 𝑚!  θ!)!                               (4) 
 
We fit each model's free parameters by minimizing the negative log of Equation 
4 with nonlinear optimization function (fmin) in the Scipy toolbox for python 
(http://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy-0.7.x/reference/optimize.html). We initialized the value 
of each motion direction choice with the participants' initial bias toward either motion 
direction, if they showed any in the practice session. Once the best-fit parameters were 
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determined for each participant, the indecision point on each trial was computed by 
solving the coherence level that yielded equal chance of choosing either motion direction 
given the rest of parameters in Equation 1. For model comparison, the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) was computed by summing the negative log of Equation 4 
over all participants and taking the number of parameters as a penalty term (Akaike 1974).  
MRI data acquisition 
Imaging data were collected using a Siemens Skyra 3T MR scanner. Functional 
data were collected using a T2*-weighted multi-band echo-planar imaging sequence 
(Moeller et al., 2010) with 60° flip-angle (TR: 2 s; TE: 30 ms; FOV: 256 mm, multi-band 
acceleration factor: 2, parallel acceleration factor: 2, matrix size: 128). Forty-eight 
oblique axial slices were collected in interleaved fashion with 2 mm isotropic resolution. 
To reduce dropout in orbito-frontal cortex, the slices were tilted at a 10-15° angle off of 
the anterior-commissure-posterior-commissure line and higher-order shimming was 
applied. T1-weighted anatomical images was collected using an MP-RAGE sequence 
with 9° flip angle (TR: 1.9 s; TE: 2.43 ms; FOV: 256 mm; Matrix size: 256 x 256, 192 
slices; slice thickness: 1 mm). 
Image preprocessing and registration 
FMRI data preprocessing was carried out using FSL Version 5.0.1 (FMRIB's 
Software Library: www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/). All image time series were aligned with the 
MCFLIRT tool, and the resulting motion parameters were used to compute frame-wise 
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displacement (FD) and temporal derivative of the root mean square variance over voxels  
(DVARS) to identify bad time points (FD>.5; DVARS>.5) (Power, Barnes, Snyder, 
Schlaggar, and Petersen 2012). The skull was removed from the functional images with 
the brain extraction tool (BET) and from the structural images using FreeSurfer 
(https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/). Spatial smoothing was applied using a Gaussian 
kernel of FWHM 5 mm. The grand-mean intensity was normalized over the entire 4D 
dataset by a single multiplicative factor, and a high-pass temporal filtering (Gaussian-
weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma=50.0 s). This same high-pass filter 
was applied to the design matrix for analyzing the fMRI time-series. All functional 
images were registered to the high resolution structural image using Boundary-Based 
Registration (BBR) then the high resolution structural image to the MNI-152 2 mm 
template using the FLIRT linear registration (12 DOF) tool of FSL. 
fMRI analysis 
We used multi-stage general linear model (GLM) approach to analyze the brain 
imaging data, using FSL FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 6.00. The first-
level model was estimated separately for each run and each participant. All five runs 
were combined within participant using a fixed-effects model. At the group level, the 
FLAME 1 mixed-effects model of FSL was applied to all participants (Worsley 2001). 
All the statistical maps were corrected by cluster-based random field theory using clusters 
determined by Z > 2.3 and a family-wise error corrected cluster significance threshold of 
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P=0.05 (Worsley 2001). The statistics maps of all analyses were projected onto the 
group-averaged brain from this study for visualization.  
GLM model 
The first level of GLM contained parametric modulated regressors to identify 
the brain mechanisms underlying the acquisition of bias in perceptual decisions as well as 
nuisance regressors to control for potential confound. The parametric modulated 
regressors included 1) the absolute value of the coherence level (duration between the 
onset and offset of the stimulus), 2) the trial-wise amount of bias (duration between trial 
onset and stimulus offset) and 3) the reward prediction error derived from both learning 
models (duration between the onset and offset of the reward feedback). The values of the 
bias were derived as the absolute value difference between the two choices from the best-
fit reinforcement-learning model at the group-level for each participant. All the values of 
parametric modulated regressors were mean-centered before entering the GLM. Nuisance 
regressors in the model were 1) a boxcar regressor encoding trial-evoked activity 
(duration between the onset of the context and the next ITI), 2) a boxcar regressor 
between the stimulus onset and the time when a key press was detected to control the 
reaction time (RT), and 3) a confound file including all the motion correction parameters 
(estimated translation and rotation and their first derivatives, FD, and DVARS) together 
with single-time-point regressors for each time point that exceeded the FD/DVARS 
thresholds (which effectively performs “scrubbing” of those time points) (Power et al. 
2012). All the regressors except the motion-correction regressors in the first-level model 
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were convolved with a double-gamma hemodynamic response function. Their temporal 
derivatives were also included in the model to accommodate for potential slice timing 
differences. Except for that the RT regressor that was orthogonalized relative to the 
regressor for the trial-evoked activity, all other regressors entered the GLM without 
orthogonalization. 
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis 
To examine the effect of the value system on the acquisition process of perceptual bias, 
we define a seed region (10-mm sphere around the vmPFC; MNI coordinates: X=-6, 
Y=39, Z=-8) according to previous results on value-based decisions (Tom, Fox, Trepel, 
and Poldrack 2007). Likewise, to examine the effect of the fronto-parietal system on the 
acquisition of bias, we defined seed regions for frontal cortex (MNI coordinates: X=-45, 
Y=21, Z=0) and parietal cortex (MNI coordinates: X=-36, Y=-39, Z=45) that have been 
replicated by previous study on perceptual bias (Fleming et al. 2010; Summerfield and 
Koechlin 2010). The BOLD activation of the seed regions was extracted from each 
participant’s individual brain in each run. For each individual and each run, the neural 
signal of the seed region was estimated by deconvolving the BOLD signals using the 
deconvolution algorithm of SPM (Gitelman, Penny, Ashburner, and Friston 2003). The 
interaction between the seed region and the regressor modulated by trial-wise amount of 
bias was generated in the neural domain and then reconvolved with hemodynamic 
function. The first-level design matrix of the PPI analysis was the above-mentioned GLM 
design matrix with two additional regressors: 1) the raw time course extracted from the 
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seed, and 2) a PPI regressor (the interaction between the amount of bias and the mean 
BOLD response in the seed region) with duration between the trial onset and the stimulus 
offset.  
RESULTS 
Behavioral results 
To visualize how the decisions changed as the experiment unfolded, the group 
average of the choice probability in each context is plotted against the coherence level 
across the five runs (Figure 2A). We first applied hierarchical logistic regression models 
to identify the factors driving the changes over the experiment. The intercept of each of 
these models was taken as a random effect across individual participants. The full model 
assumes that both the participants’ ability to discriminate motion direction and their 
preference for one of the motion directions changes from run to run in the experiment. If 
either of these factors is not constant over the experiment, removing either term from the 
full model should significantly reduce the model fit to the data. We used a chi-square test 
for model comparison to evaluate whether the drop in goodness-of-fit between the full 
and the reduced models reaches significance. We find that the interaction between 
coherence level and run number can be eliminated from the full model (𝜒! 4 = 6.15,𝑝 = .1881 >  𝛼 =  .05), suggesting that the participants’ ability to discriminate 
motion direction did not change over the entire experiment. However, removing the 
interaction between the reward context and the run number from the full model 
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significantly reduces the model fit to the data (𝜒! 4 =  72.22,𝑝 < .0001), suggesting 
that the degree of bias did change across runs of the experiment. 
 
We further examined how the participant acquired bias in perceptual decision-
making over the experiment. The participant may utilize the previous reward that had 
been received in a particular context to guide the next choice that would be made in the 
same context along with the motion coherence of the present stimulus. Alternatively, the 
participant may simply adjust their perceptual choice according to the reward obtained on 
the previous trial (independent of context) as well as the strength of the motion stimulus. 
These two possibilities were evaluated through model comparison. We find that after 
controlling for individuals’ abilities to discriminate motion direction, the reinforcement-
learning model that associates previous reward and the next choice in the same context 
fits the data better than the learning model that ignores the context (Table 1). 
 
One may suspect that the participant simply applied pre-existing knowledge 
about perceptual uncertainty and reward to make a choice rather than adjusting their 
choice from trial to trial  (Whiteley and Sahani 2008). If this is the case, the above-
mentioned hierarchical logistic regression model that treats each choice as an 
independent observation should fit the data better than the reinforcement-learning model 
that accounts for the cross-correlation between previous decision outcome and the next 
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choice made in the same context. The result of model comparison indicates that the 
reinforcement-learning model does provide a better fit to the data than the hierarchical 
logistic regression model (Table 1). Furthermore, using the reinforcement-learning model 
(Equation 1 and 2), we are able to track the trajectory of the indecision points from trial 
to trial (Figure 2B) and reproduce the choice probability up to the final trial of each run 
(solid lines in Figure 2A) at the group level. 
 
One may also suspect that in addition to the context and reward association, the 
previous choice (Lau and Glimcher 2005) or even the sequential structure of stimulus 
types (Cho et al. 2002) alone could contribute to the observed bias. We calculated the 
average correlation between residuals that are lagged behind a certain number of trials 
(autocorrelation functions) after the context and reward association has been accounted 
for in the reinforcement-learning model. If the response-by-response or stimulus-by-
stimulus structure was an additional source of bias in our experiment, we should observe 
that some of the autocorrelations in the residuals are significantly nonzero since these 
factors were ignored in the learning model. As illustrated in Figure 2C, we compared the 
autocorrelation functions estimated from the residuals against those estimated from an 
independent random process with the same number of trials. The dashed horizontal lines 
show the 95% confidence intervals for autocorrelations expected from an independent 
random process. All the autocorrelations estimated from the residuals fall well within this 
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confidence interval. This suggests that there is no appreciable temporal structure in the 
residuals after the context and reward association was taken into account. 
 
Neuroimaging results 
The neural correlates of the acquired decision bias 
Through the analyses of the behavioral data, we found that the amount of 
perceptual bias on each trial can be modeled as the subjective value difference between 
the two motion directions at that particular time point of the reinforcement-learning 
process. If perceptual bias shares the same neural basis as economic decisions, we expect 
to see that the activation of the value-based decision network (Bartra et al. 2013) 
positively correlates with the amount of bias that has been acquired at the point of each 
trial of the experiment. Using the absolute value difference between the two motion 
directions in each context that is estimated from the best-fit reinforcement-learning model 
as a parametric modulated regressor, we find that the activation of vmPFC and midbrain 
dopaminergic areas is positively correlated with the bias acquired in each reward context 
(Figure 3; Table 2). 
 
Moreover, we find that the bias acquired through reinforcement has a wider 
influence on the perceptual decision networks in the brain compared to that induced by 
explicit instructions about payoffs (Fleming et al. 2010; Summerfield et al. 2010; Mulder 
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et al. 2012) (Figure 3; Table 2). A consensus in human functional neuroimaging literature 
is that the perceptual bias induced by explicit instructions interferes with the intermediate 
stage of decision process in the fronto-parietal cortices. However, we find that the degree 
of acquired bias extends to a wider set of brain regions. In addition to the frontal and 
parietal regions, we also observe that the activation in the visual and motor cortices 
positively correlate with the amount of acquired bias from trial to trial. No regions 
showed negatively correlations with this regressor after whole-brain correction. 
Learning signals for the acquisition of decision bias 
Human fMRI studies have identified that when individuals use reward feedback 
to adjust the subjective value of taking each action, the signal pertaining to the difference 
between the expected and actual reward (reward prediction error, RPE) is represented in 
ventral striatum, a major target of midbrain dopaminergic neurons (Pagnoni, Zink, 
Montague, and Berns 2002). Recent findings further distinguish that when multiple 
reward contexts are involved in a task, the activation of fronto-parietal cortices in 
addition to the ventral striatum correlates with the PE signals (Daw et al. 2011; Glascher 
et al. 2010). Following the same framework, our reinforcement-learning model assumes 
that perceptual bias is acquired from adjusting the subjective value of each action (motion 
directions) in the context using prediction errors. Based on the above-mentioned findings, 
we suspect that our task may involve two types of RPE signals. One is derived from the 
action-outcome association; the other is derived from the action-outcome association that 
is contingent on a specific context. We used two learning models (see Methods section 
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for details) to generate each type of RPE as parametric modulated regressors in order to 
search for its neural correlates.  
 
We found that in perceptual decisions, both the context-based and context-free 
RPE regressor reveals a similar pattern of brain activation. Activation in ventral striatum, 
fronto-parietal, visual, and motor cortices positively correlated with both RPE signals 
when each of the regressors was modeled separately in a GLM. This pattern is consistent 
with the meta-analysis result of RPE signals in the brain elicited by economic decisions 
(Garrison et al. 2013). However, distinct patterns were revealed when both of the 
regressors were presented together in the same GLM. The RPE derived from the 
contextual action-outcome association positively correlated with the ventral striatum, the 
fronto-parietal cortices, and the posterior and anterior cingulate gyrus (Figure 4, yellow-
red; Table 2). In contrast, PE signals from the context-free RL model positively 
correlated with activity in the visual and motor cortices (Figure 4, blue-light blue; Table 
2). Although interesting, the interpretation of these findings is made difficult by the very 
high degree of collinearity between the context-free and context-based prediction errors. 
 
One may argue that the activation pattern that uniquely correlates with the 
context-based RPE simply reflects the level of surprise about the reward (Ding and Gold 
2010; Gottlieb 2012). We therefore added the absolute value of this RPE into the above-
mentioned model to adjust for the effect of surprise. The signed context-based RPE still 
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elicits the same activation pattern (whole-brain corrected) after the level of surprise is 
controlled in the statistical model. Furthermore, no brain regions show activation that 
correlates with this unsigned RPE after whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons. 
Thus, this result rules out the potential confound in the RPE signals owning to the 
surprise about the reward.  
The functional connectivity patterns underlying the growth of bias   
We further used psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis to examine how 
the perceptual and economic decision-making networks interact with each other as 
participants acquire bias in perceptual decisions. The reinforcement learning literature 
suggests that the value of each action is encoded in motor areas and sent to vmPFC to 
guide choices (Wunderlich, Rangel, and O'Doherty 2009). Using the same framework, 
our learning model assumes that perceptual bias at the behavioral level reflects the 
subjective value difference between each action (i.e. choosing one of the two motion 
directions) in the current context. If perceptual bias is guided by the value system, we 
should observe that the functional connectivity between vmPFC and motor region 
increases during the decision period as the bias grows. Using vmPFC (Tom et al. 2007) 
as the seed region in the PPI analysis, we find that the task-related interaction between 
vmPFC and motor cortex increases as the amount of bias increases over the experiment 
(Figure 5; Table 3).  
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We also evaluated the hypothesis that perceptual bias results from a task set 
encoded in the frontal and parietal cortices. According to this theory, bias arises from the 
mechanism that frontal and parietal regions provide top-down influence to facilitate the 
visual representation or motor response that favors the higher-valued option (Fleming et 
al. 2010; Summerfield et al. 2006). If this is the case, we should observe that the 
connectivity between the fronto-parietal and sensorimotor network gradually increase as 
individuals develop bias. To further distinguish the role of each individual brain region, 
we separated the frontal and parietal cortices into two individual seed regions and extract 
each of their activation as a regressor in two independent PPI analyses. We centered the 
seed regions of frontal and parietal cortices at the MNI coordinates in which the BOLD 
signals have been repetitively shown to correlate with the magnitudes of reward-induced 
bias in perceptual decisions (Fleming et al. 2010; Summerfield and Koechlin 2010). We 
find that these two seed regions yield distinct connectivity patterns. Using the left frontal 
cortex as a single seed region, its connectivity with vmPFC, ventral striatum, and visual 
cortex increased as bias grew (Figure 5; Table 3). On the other hand, the connectivity 
between left parietal and ACC increased as bias grew (Figure 5; Table 3).   
DISCUSSION 
We demonstrated that bias in perceptual decision-making could be acquired 
through a reinforcement learning mechanism. In perceptual decisions, individuals 
constantly learn the values of the two potential perceptual choices (e.g. the two motion 
directions in our task) by associating the deviation between the expected and actual 
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outcome (RPE) with each reward context. When the context is clearly indicated, a 
perceptual choice reflects the sum of the present sensory information and the expected 
value difference between the two options that has been learned so far. At the neural level, 
the activation of ventral striatum, frontal, and parietal cortices positively correlate with 
the contextual RPE derived from modeling each individual’s performance over the 
experiment. Furthermore, three distinct functional connectivity patterns echo the growth 
of such bias, suggesting that the value signals became increasingly integrated with neural 
systems involved in action, stimulus evaluation, and cognitive control.  These results 
reveal the shared neural mechanism between perceptual and economic decisions, and 
highlight the involvement of multiple control networks during the development of bias. 
 
There is increasing convergence across different neuroscience methods and 
across species regarding the involvement of reinforcement learning processes in 
perceptual decisions. Most of these findings focus on the improvement in individuals’ 
ability to detect or discriminate sensory information, or perceptual learning (Kahnt, 
Grueschow, Speck, and Haynes 2011; Law and Gold 2008). Here, we extend this line of 
research by showing that bias in perceptual decision-making can be acquired through the 
same learning mechanism. Given the commonality between our findings and the findings 
in perceptual learning, one may suspect that the RPE signals that we report in ventral 
striatum, frontal, and parietal cortices may simply reflect perceptual learning (Kahnt et al. 
2011) rather than the development of bias. However, we found that participants’ ability to 
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discriminate the motion direction did not improve significantly over the experiment. Our 
experiment may be too short to elicit the effect of perceptual learning, which usually 
requires more than a thousand trials (Kahnt et al. 2011; Law and Gold 2008). This 
mismatched temporal dynamic between perceptual learning and the acquisition of bias 
further rules out this alternative interpretation.  
 
Our findings also speak to the great interest in the literature regarding the 
integration of reward and sensory information in the brain during perceptual decisions. 
Using general linear model, it has been shown that reward information integrates into the 
intermediate level (frontal and parietal cortices) of perceptual decision hierarchy in the 
brain (Mulder et al. 2012; Summerfield and Koechlin 2010) that may further facilitate 
downstream visual and motor processes (Fleming et al. 2010; Liston and Stone 2008; 
Serences 2008). In this study, we further identified the neural locus for the integration of 
reward information into perceptual decision networks in the brain by tracking changes in 
functional connectivity patterns as bias developed. We found that functional connectivity 
between vmPFC-motor cortices, frontal-vmPFC-visual cortices, and parietal-ACC 
increases with the growth of perceptual bias. These distinct connectivity patterns reveal a 
more integrated view than previous findings and suggest that multiple mechanisms 
contribute to bias in perceptual decisions through integration of value processing with 
action, sensory, and control systems. 
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Since perceptual decisions are usually analyzed under the framework of drift-
diffusion process, one obvious question is how our finding relates to this tradition. In fact, 
many theoretical approaches have been proposed to account for the function of basal 
ganglia and its contribution to the learning of perceptual bias in terms of drift-diffusion 
process (Bogacz and Larsan 2011; Rao 2010). However, it is very challenging to 
empirically test these theories at the whole brain level. The difficulty is that bias induced 
by reward usually is weak in human studies using reaction time tasks (Mulder et al. 2012) 
because of the speed-and-accuracy trade-off (Maddox and Bohil 1998; Simen et al. 2009). 
In order to investigate the acquisition process of perceptual bias, we applied decision 
deadline to boost the effect of reward-induced bias since this type of bias usually occurs 
in fast choices and suggests the influence on the starting point of the drift-diffusion 
process (Mulder et al. 2012; Summerfield and Koechlin 2010). Using this manipulation, 
we present the first empirical evidence showing the role of basal ganglia in the 
acquisition of perceptual bias and three functional connectivity patterns pertaining to 
expressing the acquired bias in the human brain. However, the drawback of this 
manipulation is that it limits the interpretation of our finding to the speeded decisions and 
prevents us from applying the drift-diffusion model to the present data. Future study 
should focus on identifying the neural mechanisms by which bias presents as individuals 
freely adjust reaction time in order to maximize reward. 
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In conclusion, the present study shows that perceptual bias can arise from the 
neural mechanisms that learn the association between contexts and choice outcomes. The 
learning signals (contextual RPE) are observed in ventral striatum, frontal, and parietal 
cortices. The acquired bias mirrors the learned value difference between each perceptual 
choice at the behavioral level and correlates with multiple connectivity patterns 
suggesting that the information about value contributes to perceptual bias through 
interactions with multiple systems. Our results demonstrate the pervasive effects of 
reinforcement learning mechanisms on the whole-brain connectivity by which the 
subjective expectation of reward colors the interpretation of objective evidence in 
decision-making process. 
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Chapter 2: Training of loss aversion modulates neural sensitivity 
toward potential gains 
INTRODUCTION 
When facing uncertain outcomes, people tend to be more sensitive toward the 
potential losses than the potential gains. This tendency can lead to poor investment 
decisions that derail investors from their financial plans. Theories in psychology and 
economics attribute loss aversion to different sensitivities when transforming the possible 
gains and losses into subjective value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). This asymmetrical response to potential outcomes has found its neural 
basis in the brain regions processing value (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007) or 
emotional (Canessa et al., 2013; De Martino, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010; Sokol-Hessner, 
Camerer, & Phelps, 2013) information. 
 
Although multiple neural systems entail the loss aversion effect by responding 
more strongly to potential losses than to potential gains, the regulation of loss aversion 
has been focused majorly on its emotional component. Strategies for regulating negative 
emotional responses, such as reappraisal or taking different perspectives, has been shown 
effective in lessening the aversive emotion triggered by the potential losses, which 
correlates with the reduction of loss aversion in financial decisions (Sokol-Hessner et al., 
2009). However, in addition to the emotion system (amygdala) in the brain, the value 
system (ventral striatum and vmPFC) is another neural basis of behavioral loss aversion 
(Tom et al., 2007). Several mechanisms have been shown to effectively alter the 
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responses of the value system in order to make optimal choices. However, the 
possibilities of utilizing these potential mechanisms to tackle the value system with the 
aim of regulating loss aversion in financial choices remain unexplored. Here we provide 
the first evidence showing a novel mechanism through which loss aversion can be 
dynamically adjusted in order to fulfill the demands of current decision contexts. 
 
Economic decisions can be altered through modulating the value system, 
specifically the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). One of the mechanisms that 
can modify the response of vmPFC in value-based decision-making is reinforcement 
learning. Through trial-and-error, the difference between the expected and the actual 
choice outcomes (reward prediction errors) triggers the activation in ventral striatum that 
in term adjusts the subjective value encoded in the vmPFC (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 
2013; Garrison, Erdeniz, & Done, 2013; Glimcher, 2011; Lee, Seo, & Jung, 2012; 
Schultz, 1998). This subjective value then determines which actions are worth repeating 
in the future. Since loss aversion can be explained by the asymmetrical responses of the 
value system (ventral striatum and vmPFC) toward the potential gains and the potential 
losses (Tom et al., 2007), this reinforcement learning mechanism implies that loss 
aversion can be either enhanced or reduced by providing reward feedback to encourage 
either type of decisions about uncertain financial outcomes. 
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Alternatively, the value system can also be modulated by the cognitive control 
system in order to achieve the desirable goal by following certain rules. Overcoming 
tempting but suboptimal choices according to the current decision context requires the 
cognitive control system (frontal and parietal cortices) to suppress the unwanted drives 
(Bunge, 2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001). This interaction between the cognitive control and 
value systems in a task can be measured as functional connectivity and has been shown to 
correlate with whether people can successfully inhibit their temptation of eating 
preferable but unhealthy food in order to follow their diet plans (Hare, Camerer, & 
Rangel, 2009). This mechanism implies that offering a rule for evaluating uncertain 
outcomes in a decision context should elicit the interaction between the cognitive control 
and value systems. This in turn may alter the level of loss aversion according to the 
present decision context. 
 
We showed that the level of loss aversion is modifiable, and that this is 
associated with changes in activation of the value system (vmPFC). During functional 
brain imaging scans, participants were asked to decide whether to accept or reject a stock 
offering equal chance to either win or lose a certain amount of money. These stocks were 
presented in two different decision contexts. One context provided reward feedback to 
encourage riskier decisions (i.e. loss neutral) whereas the other offered reward feedback 
that reinforced more conservative decisions (i.e. more loss averse). In order to maximize 
the reward, the participants must use feedback from trial to trial to learn the optimal rule 
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for deciding in either context. At the end of this training, they were probed to apply what 
they had learned when evaluating uncertain outcomes in each context without trial-wise 
feedback.  
 
We found that the level of loss aversion can be enhanced or reduced according 
to the decision context by respectively decreasing or increasing the sensitivities toward 
the potential gains but not the potential losses. The activation in cognitive control system 
(frontal, parietal, and middle temporal cortices) mirrored this behavioral pattern during 
the training. Furthermore, over the course of learning, the functional connectivity 
between the cognitive control and value system gradually decreased when the 
participants evaluated the potential gains in the loss neutral context. After this training, 
while participants’ choices were modulated by the decision contexts, the value system 
becomes more sensitive toward the potential gains in the loss neutral context than that in 
the conservative context. The findings suggest that the level of loss aversion can be 
flexibly adjusted via releasing value system’s inhibited response toward the potential 
gains from the cognitive control system. These highlight the important role of cognitive 
control systems in decision-making under risk and provide insights about how cognitive 
control can refine investment choices in order to achieve the desired financial goal. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants Sixty	human	participants	completed	the	behavioral	paradigm	in	the	MRI	scanner	(31	females,	29	males;	age	range:	18	–	30	with	mean	22.9-year-old).	The	sample	size	was	determined	by	a	power	analysis	using	the	fMRIpower	software	package	(http://fmripower.org/;	Mumford	&	Nichols,	2008)	based	on	pilot	imaging	data	from	8	participants.	Two	of	the	participants	were	discarded	from	the	brain	imaging	analyses;	one	due	to	missing	the	anatomical	image,	and	the	other	due	to	excessive	head	movement	(more	than	one-third	of	the	volumes	were	considered	“bad	time	points”	according	to	the	motion	correction	procedures	detailed	in	the	Preprocessing	section).	All	participants	were	recruited	through	posted	flyers	and	were	prescreened.	They	were	free	of	any	self-reported	neurological	or	psychiatric	diseases,	had	normal	or	corrected-to-normal	visual	acuity	and	normal	color	vision,	and	right-handed.	They	gave	written	informed	consent	for	participation.	The	Institutional	Review	Board	of	the	University	of	Texas	at	Austin	approved	all	experimental	procedures.	
Stimuli and Apparatus 
We utilized a mixed gambles task for measuring individuals’ sensitivity to 
potential gains and losses (Tom	et	al.,	2007). To fit into the cover story of this 
experiment, which will be described in details in the Procedures and task section, we 
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called these stimuli “stocks”, and they had equal chance to gain or loss a certain amount 
of money. In the baseline and the probe session, the potential gains ranged from $10 to 
$40 with the increment of $4 whereas the potential losses ranged from $5 to $20 with the 
increment of $2 (Figure 6, top- and bottom-right). In the training session, each stock was 
a random sample from six levels of gain-to-loss ratio (.52–.79, .88–1.07, 1.18 – 1.8, 2.1–
2.41, 2.59–3.17, 3.21–6.33) with a potential gain selected uniformly between $9 and $62 
and a potential loss selected uniformly between $3 and $52 (Figure 6, middle-right). The 
number of trials at each level of the gain-to-loss ratio was adjusted according to the 
decision criterion of each decision context (1.12 and 2.5, respectively), so that there was 
the same number of the acceptance and rejection responses in each context. This ensured 
that the observed behavior was not due to response bias (Green	&	Swets,	1966). The 
overall expected value of the two stimulus sets were both positive (2.84, 8.56) but 
significantly different (t(238) = -6.44, p<.0001).  
 
The experiment was programmed and delivered in python version 2.6 on Mac 
OS 10.6.8. The randomization procedure was conducted using numpy version 1.6.1 
(http://www.numpy.org/), and the stimulus presentation and the response recording were 
controlled by pygame version 1.9.1 (http://www.pygame.org/). 
Procedures and task 
The experiment was presented to participants as a stock market investment 
scenario. As illustrated in the left panel of Figure 6, three phases were designed to 
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measure participants’ own loss aversion tendency (baseline), to shift their loss aversion 
tendency using contextual feedback (training), and to test how this training was 
consolidated in each context without immediate feedback (probe). Participants performed 
all the phases during the fMRI acquisition. They did not receive endowment before they 
came for the experiment. They were told that the outcome that they received in the first 
phase would be their initial reward points to start the rest of the phases. The decision 
contexts and response buttons were counter-balanced across the group of participants to 
remove any potential stimulus or response confounds. The inter-trial interval was 
sampled from a truncated exponential distribution (mean = 3 sec., range = 2.5 – 8 sec.) 
and the randomized orders of trial types and stimuli presentation in all the three phases 
were the top sixty design matrices from 10,000 simulation with the highest efficiency for 
contrasting the gain variable between the two decision contexts and for contrasting the 
loss variable between the two decision contexts. The procedures of each phase are 
detailed below. 
 
Phase 1: Baseline. As shown in Figure 6 (top-left), on each trial, participants 
saw a set of stocks offering 50-50 chances to either win or lose a certain amount of 
money. They had to press one of the four buttons to indicate whether they strongly 
accept, weekly accept, weekly reject, or strongly reject each stock into their own 
investment portfolio in 2.5 s. The trial would be aborted if no response made during this 
time window. At the end of this phase, one of the trials was randomly selected and 
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revealed the outcome. If the participant previously accepted this selected stock, a 
Bernoulli trial with probability of .5 would determine the payoff according to the amount 
of potential gains and potential losses offering by this stock. If the participant rejected 
this selected stock, the payoff would be zero. The outcome of this selected stock then 
became the initial number of reward points for the participants to continue collecting 
reward points in the next phase.  
 
Phase 2: Training This phase was designed to use feedback for encouraging 
participants to use two different risk preferences as they decided whether to accept or 
reject a stock for one of two clients specified by a pre-trial cue. Participants were asked to 
review stocks with one of the two clients and suggest that client whether to accept or 
reject the stock into the client’s investment portfolio. Figure 6 (middle-left) illustrates the 
events timeline of a trial. In the beginning of every trial, the participants saw for whom 
they would be providing investment suggestion for 1 s. Then, they saw a stock that has 
equal chance to win or lose certain amount of money. They had up to 2.5 s to decide 
whether they would suggest the client to accept or reject that stock by pressing buttons. 
Immediately after the participants responded, they saw the number of reward points that 
they earned or deducted from the client for 1.5 s. As shown in Figure 6, one of the clients 
was loss-neutral and would accept the stock as long as the potential gain is 1.12 times 
greater than the potential losses (riskier context). The other was loss averse and would 
accept the stock at least the potential gains were 2.5 times greater than the potential losses 
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(conservative context). If the participants’ suggestion matched each client’s investment 
preference, they would earn 10 reward points; otherwise, they would lose 10 reward 
points. Participants were unaware of the clients’ preferences before they began the 
experiment. They simply were told to make suggestion that they thought would maximize 
their total reward points over the course of this phase. 
 
Phase 3: Probe. This phase was designed to evaluate how the previous 
experiences in the two decision contexts would influence the participants’ decision-
making under risk without the guidance of immediate feedback. The events timeline were 
the same as in the previous phase, except for that no feedback was presented on every 
trial and that the stimuli in each decision context were the same set of stocks used in the 
first phase (Figure 6, bottom-left). The participants were requested to maximize their 
reward points that were accumulated in the background by applying what they had 
learned about each client’s preference when making a suggestion. The decision criterion 
and payment structure in each context was exactly the same as in the previous training. 
At the end of this phase, the total reward points that have been collected by each 
participant over the three phases were convert into bonus and added into the 
compensation (500 reward points = 1 USD).    
Behavioral analysis 
Baseline phase. We followed the same analysis procedures as in the (Tom	et	al.,	2007) to estimate each individuals’ loss aversion tendency. We applied logistic 
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regression to estimate three parameters in the model from each individual’s choice data: 
choice biases (𝛽!), sensitivity toward the potential gains (𝛽!"#$%), and sensitivity toward 
the potential losses (𝛽!"##$#). The loss aversion tendency for each individual was 
indicated as the ratio between the sensitivities toward the potential losses and the 
potential gains (𝜆 =  −𝛽!"##$# 𝛽!"!"#). We added the negative sign in this indicator 
because the absolute value of the potential losses was used in the model. 
 
Training phase. The analyses were done at the two levels. At the first level, we 
applied logistic regression model to each of the five scanning runs to estimate choice 
biases, sensitivity toward the potential gains and losses for each participant. The loss 
aversion indicator (𝜆) was also derived for each individual from run to run in each 
condition. 
 
At the second level, all these parameters were used as the dependent variables 
for repeated measure ANOVA test. We focused on testing whether there was any 
significant interaction between the two decision contexts and the five scanning runs. This 
would show how the sensitivities toward the gains and losses changed when people 
learned to become riskier or more conservative in evaluating the uncertain outcomes. 
 
Probe phase. The above-mentioned analysis procedures were used in this phase 
as well. At the second level analysis, we used paired t-test to examine whether the 
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participants’ loss aversion tendencies were significantly different across the two 
conditions.  The same test was applied to identify the differences in either the 
sensitivities toward the potential gains or the potential losses across the two decision 
contexts. 
 
All the first level analysis was done using the logistic regression function in the 
scikit-learn package version 0.1 (http://scikit-
learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.linear_model.LogisticRegression.html) that 
empirically provided more robust parameter estimation against the problems of complete 
separation in binary data. The second level analysis was done using R with the nlme 
package (http://stat.ethz.ch/R-manual/R-devel/library/nlme/html/lme.html). We were 
aware that the two-level analysis could be done using the hierarchical logistic regression 
in the same package. However, the parameter estimation of this model did not converge, 
leading us to adopt the two-level analysis as stated. 
FMRI acquisition 
Imaging data were collected using a Siemens Skyra 3T MR scanner. Functional 
data were collected using a T2*-weighted multi-band echo-planar imaging sequence 
(TR=1.16 ms, TE=30 ms, flip angle=63 degrees, voxel size=2.4 X 2.4 X 2 mm, distance 
factor=20%, 96x96 matrix, FOV=230 mm, MB factor=4, 64 slics). To reduce dropout in 
orbito-frontal cortex, the slices were tilted at a 30° back from the anterior-commissure-
posterior-commissure line and higher-order shimming was applied. T1-weighted 
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anatomical images was collected using an MP-RAGE sequence with 8° flip angle (256 
sagittal slices, voxel size=.8 X .8 X .8 mm, TR=2.4 s, TE=1.94 ms, TI=1000 ms, PAT=2, 
FOV=205 mm).  
Image preprocessing and registration 
FMRI data preprocessing was carried out using FSL Version 5.0.1 (FMRIB's Software 
Library: www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/). All image time series were aligned using the MCFLIRT 
tool, and the resulting motion parameters were used to compute frame-wise displacement 
(FD) and temporal derivative of the root mean square variance over voxels (DVARS) to 
identify bad time points (FD>.5; DVARS>.5) (Power et al., 2012). The skull was 
removed from the functional images with the brain extraction tool (BET) and from the 
structural images using FreeSurfer (https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/). Spatial 
smoothing was applied using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 5 mm. The grand-mean 
intensity was normalized over the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor, and 
a high-pass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with 
sigma=50.0 s). This same high-pass filter was applied to the design matrix for analyzing 
the fMRI time-series. All functional images were registered to the high resolution 
structural image using Boundary-Based Registration (BBR) then the high resolution 
structural image to the MNI-152 2 mm template using the FNIRT nonlinear registration 
(12 DOF; Wrap resolution: 10mm) tool of FSL. 
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FMRI analysis We	used	a	multi-stage	general	linear	model	(GLM)	approach	to	analyze	the	brain	imaging	data	with	FSL	FEAT	(FMRI	Expert	Analysis	Tool)	Version	6.00.	The	first-level	model	was	estimated	separately	for	each	run	and	each	participant.	All	five	runs	in	the	training	and	two	runs	in	the	probe	were	separately	combined	within	participant	using	a	fixed-effects	model.	When	testing	the	learning	effect,	a	linear	contrast	was	added	into	the	second	level	design	matrix.	At	the	group	level,	the	FLAME	1	mixed-effects	model	of	FSL	was	applied	to	all	participants	(Worsley,	2001).	All	the	statistical	maps	were	corrected	by	cluster-based	random	field	theory	using	clusters	determined	by	Z	>	2.3	and	a	family-wise	error	corrected	cluster	significance	threshold	of	P=0.05	(Worsley,	2001).	The	statistical	maps	for	all	analyses	were	projected	onto	the	group-averaged	brain	from	this	study	for	visualization.	 	
General Linear Model (GLM) 
The first level of GLM contained parametric modulated regressors to identify 
the brain activation correlating with the potential gains and the potential losses as well as 
nuisance regressors to control for potential confound. A confound file included all the 
motion correction parameters (estimated translation and rotation and their first 
derivatives, FD, and DVARS) together with single-time-point regressors for each time 
point that exceeded the FD/DVARS thresholds (which effectively performs “scrubbing” 
of those time points)(Power	et	al.,	2012). All the regressors except the motion-
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correction regressors in the first-level model were convolved with a double-gamma 
hemodynamic response function. Their temporal derivatives were also included in the 
model to accommodate for potential slice timing differences. All parametric modulated 
regressors were mean centered before entering the model. The regressors used in the 
design matrix of each phase were described in details below.  
 
Baseline phase. There were five regressors in the design matrix. Two parametric 
modulated regressors encoded the amount of potential gains and the amount of potential 
losses. The duration of these regressors started from trial onset and lasted for the mean 
response time of each participant in this phase. Three nuisance regressors were used to 
model each trial, response time, and missing trials. The trial and missing trial regressors 
were boxcar regressors beginning at the trial onset and lasting the duration of the mean 
response time of each participant in this phase as well. Response time was modeled as an 
additional parametric regressor starting from the trial onset with 1 sec. duration and 
mean-centered response time as its amplitude. This procedure was used to model the 
effect of response time in the rest of the phases as well. 
 
Training and probe phase. Nine regressors were included in the design matrix of 
the training phase. Four parametric modulated regressors were used to model the 
potential gains and losses in each of the two conditions. These regressors started from the 
trial onset with the duration of mean response time plus two seconds to accommodate the 
 
 
46 
presentation of the context cues and feedbacks. Another parametric regressor indicated 
the amplitude of feedback starting from the feedback onset with the duration of 1 sec. 
Four additional regressors were included: two for the onset of trials from each context, 
one for the missing trial, and the other one for the response time. These regressors were 
generated with the same procedures as described in the previous section, except for that 
the duration here was two seconds plus the mean of each participant’s response time in 
each run. In the probe phase, the regressors were the same as in the training phase, except 
for that there was no regressor indicating the feedback since there was no feedback in this 
phase. The duration of the regressors was the participant’s mean response time in each 
run plus 1 second to account for the presentation of the cue. Four nuisance regressors 
were included: two for the onset of trials from each context, one for the missing trial, and 
the other one for the response time. The regressor for the response time was 
parametrically modulated with 1 second duration and the mean-centered response time as 
its amplitude. 
Psychophysiological Interaction (PPI) 
We used PPI analysis to examine the changes in functional connectivity between 
the vmPFC and the rest of brain as the participants become more conservative or risky in 
evaluating the uncertain outcomes. The vmPFC region was selected from the peak 
response to the potential gains in the probe phase (10-mm sphere around the vmPFC; 
MNI coordinates [x, y, z] = [-12, 54, -4]). The BOLD activation of the seed region was 
extracted from each participant’s individual brain in each run. For each individual and 
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each run, the neural signal of the seed region was estimated by deconvolving the BOLD 
signals using the deconvolution algorithm of SPM (Gitelman,	Penny,	Ashburner,	&	Friston,	2003). The interaction between the seed region and the regressor parametrically 
modulated by the potential gains or the potential losses was generated in the neural 
domain and then reconvolved with hemodynamic function. The first-level design matrix 
of the PPI analysis was the above-mentioned GLM design matrix with five additional 
regressors: the raw time course extracted from the seed and four PPI regressors. The PPI 
regressors indicate the interaction between the mean BOLD response in the seed region 
and the amount of gain or losses in either of the two context, respectively.  
RESULTS 
Behavioral results 
The participants followed the instructions to accumulate the reward points over 
the three phases of the experiment. On average, they earned -8.5 points in the first phase 
(standard deviation = 5.76) as their initial points, 1490 points over the five training runs 
(standard deviation = 182.12), and 972 points in the probe (standard deviation = 156.54). 
There was no significant effect of the initial points on the performance in the subsequent 
phases. The correlation between the number of initial points and the points that collected 
in the training (Pearson’s correlation = -0.09, p = .48 > α = .05), the probe (Pearson’s 
correlation = -0.001, p = .94 > α = .05), or the total points gained over these two 
subsequent phases (Pearson’s correlation = -0.06, p = .65 > α = .05). 
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Using our paradigm, we replicated previous findings that people are loss averse 
when facing uncertain outcomes. In the first phase of experiment, the participants were 
asked to decide whether to accept or reject a stock offering an equal chance to win or lose 
a certain amount of money, which later became their initial reward points to start the rest 
of the sessions. Using hierarchical logistic regression with individuals taken as random 
effects in the model, we found that the participants did not show any significant 
preference for either choice (z = 1.608, p = 0.108 > α = .05). Instead, their choices were 
significantly dominated by the potential gains (averaged 𝛽!"#$ =  .27, z = 27.05, 
p<.0001) and the potential losses shown on each stock (𝛽!"## =  −.40, z = -23.53, 
p<.0001). The negative value here is because the absolute value of the potential losses 
was used in the model. Each participant’s level of loss aversion also was characterized by 
the loss aversion indicator (λ): the ratio between the absolute parameter estimates for the 
potential losses (Figure 7B, top panel) versus potential gains (Figure 7B, top panel) based 
on the logistic regression that was individually applied to everyone’s choice data (Tom et 
at., 2007). The group average of this indicator (λ) is 1.4 (standard deviation= .54; median 
= 1.29, range = .63 – 3.58). This value reflected the indecision points shown in Figure 
8A. When the ratio between the potential gains and the potential losses fell around 1.4, 
participants were equally likely to accept or reject those stocks (green grids in the left 
panel of Figure 8A) and spent longer time to decide (brown grids in the right panel of 
Figure 8A). The value of the loss aversion indicator was lower than the previous study 
(λ=1.93 [Tom et al., 2007]). A potential reason why participants in the present study 
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showed weaker loss aversion could be that they did not receive an endowment 
beforehand as in that study.  
 
During training, we found that loss aversion can be either enhanced or reduced 
through feedback. As shown in Figure 6 (middle left panel), the same task was presented 
in two decision contexts with feedback to either enhance (conservative) or reduce (risky) 
loss aversion. In the risky context, the feedback encouraged the participants to accept the 
stocks as long as the potential gains were 1.12 times greater than the potential losses (loss 
neutral). In the conservative context, the feedback reinforced them to accept those as long 
as the potential gains were at least 2.5 times greater than the potential losses (more loss 
averse). Figure 7A shows that this procedure gradually changed the participants’ levels of 
loss aversion. In the first run, the indecision points of accepting a stock in both decision 
contexts were around the third level of the gain-to-loss ratio (gray dashed lines in Figure 
7A). The mean gain-to-loss ratio of this bin was 1.49 that was within one standard 
deviation of the original loss aversion indicator at the group level (mean λ = 1.4, standard 
deviation = .54). However, as the experiment proceeded, the indecision points shifted 
leftward when the participants were encouraged to use a risker criterion (Figure 7A; light 
blue - blue). On the contrary, this point shifted rightward when a more conservative 
criterion was reinforced (Figure 7A; light brown - brown).    	
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We also used logistic regression model to identify how the participants’ loss 
aversion changed in each decision context over the course of training. The ratio between 
the regression coefficients for the loss and gain variables (loss aversion indicator) 
estimated in each decision context was then plotted against the five training runs to 
illustrate these changes (Figure 7B, bottom panel). We found a significant interaction 
effect between the decision context and the training runs on the loss aversion indicator 
(repeated measured ANOVA, context x run interaction: F(4, 531) = 9.6570, p < .0001), 
suggesting that the participants gradually learn to become risky or conservative according 
to the decision context.  
 
We further tested whether the changes in the sensitivity toward the potential 
gains or the potential losses contributed to the different loss aversion in the two decision 
contexts over the training. As shown in the top panel of Figure 7B, we found that the 
participants became more sensitive toward the potential gains when they were 
encouraged to become risker compared to when they were encouraged to become more 
conservative (repeated-measure ANOVA, context x run interaction: F(4, 531) = 13.6393; 
p < .0001). They also become more sensitive toward the potential losses in both 
conditions over this course (repeated-measure ANOVA, context x run interaction: F(4, 
531) = 4.1548; p = .0025 < α = .05). However, this incremental trend was very similar in 
both contexts (Figure 7B). This indicates that the sensitivity toward the potential gains 
largely mediated the training of loss aversion in the two decision contexts. 
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Finally, we found that two decision contexts continued influencing the 
participants’ decisions about the uncertain outcomes even when no immediate feedback 
was presented. As shown in Figure 8B and 8C, the indecision points (green grids in the 
left panels) were close to the criteria that the participants were encouraged to used in the 
previous session (gain-to-loss ratio as 1.12 or 2.5). It also took longer for the participants 
to decide when the potential gains and potential losses pair fell near these ratios (brown 
grids in the right panels). Their loss aversion tendencies were significantly different 
between the two contexts (paired t-test: t(59) = -12.3943, p < .0001; Figure 7B bottom 
panel). This distinct pattern of loss aversion can be attributed to the different sensitivities 
toward the potential gains (paired t-test: t(59) = 8.3373, p < .0001; Figure 7B top panel) 
but not that toward the potential losses (paired t-test: t(59) = -0.3781, p = 0.7067 > α 
= .05; Figure 7B top panel) in the two contexts.  
Brain imaging results 
In the baseline phase, we replicated previous findings that loss aversion 
correlated with the responses of the value system toward the potential gains and the 
potential losses. Behaviorally, we found that the participants would accept the stock at 
least the potential gains are 1.4 times greater than the potential losses, which decisions 
also took them longer to make (Figure 8A). We also found that the activation in the value 
system correlated with the participants’ choices. As shown in Figure 9, the vmPFC (MNI 
coordinates [x, y, z] =  [4, 38, -14]; cluster size = 603 voxels; Zmax = 4.26, P = .0007) 
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positively correlated with the potential gains after whole-brain corrected for multiple 
comparisons. It also de-activated as the potential losses increased, as shown previously 
(Tom et al., 2007); however, this effect was weaker in our sample (Figure 9, 
uncorrected), which may because our participants on average were less loss averse as 
previous study.  
Changing the sensitivity toward the potential gains relies on cognitive control  
We first used the general linear model to identify the brain areas whose activity 
was correlated with changes in loss aversion over the course of learning. The potential 
gains and losses entered the design matrix as parametric modulated regressors that were 
separated into two sets for modeling the effect of the two decision contexts. We searched 
the whole brain for areas showing different neural sensitivities toward the potential gains 
or the potential losses between the two decision contexts. We found that the value and 
cognitive control systems responded more strongly toward the potential gains in the risky 
than the conservative conditions over the training (Figure 10A, Table 4). To be qualified 
as the learning mechanisms, this difference should also increase from run to run, 
indicating the linear trend of learning as shown in the behavioral results (top panel in 
Figure 10B). We found that the activation of three brain regions in the cognitive control 
system matched this selection criterion when they responded to the potential gains 
(Figure 10B, red-yellow, Table 4 and Figure 10C; red shaded plots). These brain regions 
were right middle frontal gyrus (MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [30, 36, 52]; cluster size = 
653 voxels; Zmax = 4.33, P = .0002), right angular gyrus of the parietal cortex (MNI 
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coordinates [x, y, z] =  [46, -54, 32]; cluster size = 664 voxels; Zmax = 4.58, P = .0002), 
and right middle temporal gyrus (MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [60, -8, -22]; cluster size 
= 373 voxels; Zmax = 4.29, P = .0157). No activation in other regions showed this linear 
trend that survived the whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons.  
 
We also searched for brain regions that gradually showed differentiable 
activation toward the potential losses between the two contexts. We found that the 
activation in the cognitive control and value systems (Figure 10A; Table 4) also 
responded more strongly toward the potential losses during training. However, only the 
activation in the right frontal pole (MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [30, 60, 12]; cluster size 
= 417 voxels; Zmax = 4.2, P = .0065) showed a linear trend such that it became 
increasingly stronger in the riskier context compared to the conservative context over 
training (Figure 10B, blue-light blue, Table 4, and Figure 10C; blue shaded plots).  
Cognitive control system releases supression from the value system during learning 
We further tested the hypothesis that the interaction between the value and 
cognitive control systems was necessary to execute preferable choices according to the 
decision context (Hare	et	al.,	2009). We centered the seed region at the vmPFC (MNI 
coordinates [x, y, z] =  [-12, 54, -4]) with 10mm radius covering the surrounding voxels. 
If using the decision contexts to adjust loss aversion requires the cognitive control system 
to modulate the value system, we should observe that the functional connectivity between 
the two is altered in the two contexts during the training. Furthermore, this change should 
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be more pronounced in response to the potential gains than to the potential losses based 
on our behavioral results. As shown in Figure 11A and Table 5, the interaction between 
vmPFC and the left middle frontal cortex (MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [-35, 14, 48]; 
cluster size = 508 voxels; Zmax = 4.15, P = .0014) and the left supramarginal gyrus of the 
parietal cortex (MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [-47, -46, 43]; cluster size = 401 voxels; 
Zmax = 3.38, P = .0076) became differentiable across the two contexts when responding to 
the potential gains over the training. As shown in the plots of Figure 11B, the functional 
connectivity between the vmPFC and frontal cortex gradually increased when the 
participants became less sensitive toward the potential gains in the context where 
conservative choices were preferred. However, this connectivity gradually decreased 
when the participants learned to be more sensitive toward the potential gains in the 
context where riskier choices were reinforced. On the other hand, the functional 
connectivity between vmPFC and the parietal cortex was overall greater in the 
conservative context than that in the risky context (Figure 11B). When responding to the 
potential losses, we found that the functional connectivity between the vmPFC and the 
superior parietal cortex (MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [11, -52, 66]; cluster size = 1706 
voxels; Zmax = 4.2, P < .0001), angular gyrus (MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [54, -54, 31]; 
cluster size = 331 voxels; Zmax = 3.53, P = .016), and midbrain area (MNI coordinates [x, 
y, z] =  [-2, -21, -36]; cluster size = 408 voxels; Zmax = 4.35, P = .0041) were greater in 
the conservative than that in the riskier context during the training (Figure 11A, blue-light 
blue; Table 5).  
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The functional connectivity between the vmPFC and the rest of the brain only 
occurred in the training. During the probe, no brain areas showed significant differences 
in functional connectivity between the vmPFC across the two decision contexts in 
responding to either the potential gains or losses. This is also the case after we restricted 
the search within the regions showing different connectivity patterns in the two contexts 
during the training.  
Value and cognitive control systems modulate loss aversion after training 
The above-mentioned finings together with the suggested function between the 
cognitive control and value system (Hare	et	al.,	2009) implies that reducing loss 
aversion by being more sensitive toward the potential gains relies on the interaction of 
cognitive control systems with the value system. If this is the case, after this training, we 
should expect that the value system remained more sensitive toward the potential gains 
when probed in the context reinforcing riskier choices. Our data supported this 
hypothesis. We found that both the value (vmPFC, MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [-12, 54, 
-4]; cluster size = 404 voxels; Zmax = 3.81, P = .0154) and the cognitive control systems 
(middle frontal gyrus: MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [28, 36, 40]; cluster size = 464 
voxels; Zmax = 3.83, P = .0065; angular gyrus: MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [54, -48, 18]; 
cluster size = 337 voxels; Zmax = 4.07, P = .0424) become more sensitive toward the 
potential gains in the context where the participants were trained to be riskier compared 
to the more conservative context (Figure 12, red-yellow; Table 4). Behaviorally, the 
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participants responded to the potential losses with equal sensitivities in the two conditions 
(Figure 7B, top panel); however, we observed that the parietal (supramarginal gyrus: 
MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [56, -42, 28]; cluster size = 933 voxels; Zmax = 3.98, P 
< .0001) and supplementary motor area (MNI coordinates [x, y, z] =  [4, -2, 60]; cluster 
size = 365 voxels; Zmax = 3.65, P = .0357) were more sensitive toward the potential losses 
in the riskier context than that in the more conservative context (Figure 12, blue – light 
blue; Table 4).  
DISCUSSION 
We have illustrated that a cognitive control process can account for the 
adjustment of behavioral and neural loss aversion according to the environmental 
demands. We found that people become more sensitive toward the potential gains when 
learning to be loss neutral. This change correlates with the linearly increasing activation 
of the cognitive control system (frontal and parietal cortices) during the training. 
Meanwhile, the functional connectivity between the vmPFC and the frontal lobe 
decreased when the participants learned to become more sensitive toward potential gains 
in the risky context. After this training, the two decision contexts continued modulating 
the participants’ loss aversion tendencies: they were more sensitive toward the potential 
gains in the loss neutral context while their sensitivities toward the potential losses were 
the same in both contexts. Underlying this behavioral change, we found that both the 
cognitive and the value systems activated more strongly toward the potential gains in the 
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loss neutral context than that in its conservative counterpart. These suggest that gradually 
reducing the influence of the cognitive control system is necessary for the value system to 
become more sensitive toward the potential gains, which then neutralizes the tendency 
toward loss aversion in decision-making under risk. 
 
Some theories propose that regulating negative emotion could modulate loss 
aversion; however, our results suggest that this idea is relatively speculative. We did not 
observe any activation in brain areas involved in emotion process (amygdala) correlated 
with loss aversion tendencies in any phase of our experiment. Fundamentally, whether 
negative emotion can explain the overly sensitive toward the potential losses, which leads 
to behavioral loss aversion, is still debatable since the results from neural imaging studies 
are inconsistent (Canessa	et	al.,	2013;	De	Martino	et	al.,	2010;	Sokol-Hessner	et	al.,	2013;	Tom	et	al.,	2007). Specifically, the activation in amygdala, the brain region 
correlating with negative emotion process and used as an indicator of the emotional 
component of loss aversion, is not consistently observed in the literature. Even though 
this discrepancy may be due to the difference in experimental designs and regulating loss 
aversion did involve regulating negative emotion (Sokol-Hessner	et	al.,	2009), the 
evidence supporting the role of cognitive control system in this regulation is indirect. In 
the recent finding, the cognitive control system (dlPFC) showed greater baseline 
responses during the decision period in the “emotion regulation” condition. However, this 
activity neither particularly correlates with the process of the potential losses nor links to 
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the activation in amygdala via functional connectivity (Sokol-Hessner	et	al.,	2013). It is 
hence doubtful that loss aversion can be reduced by emotion regulation. 
 
We present a novel mechanism that a direct relationship between the cognitive 
control and the value systems can regulate the loss aversion through increasing the 
sensitivity toward the potential gains. This finding extends the functional connectivity 
between cognitive control and value system in value-based decision-making. The 
cognitive control system (dlPFC) has been shown sending signals to value system 
(vmPFC) via a two-node functional connection to suppress the value of the unwanted 
feature, relative to the goal, of each decision target (Hare	et	al.,	2009). Here, instead of 
this two-node connectivity between the cognitive control and the value systems, we 
report a direct functional connection and bidirectional effect on this suppression 
mechanism in modulating loss aversion. When more conservative choices were 
reinforced, the dlPFC gradually showed stronger functional connectivity with vmPFC in 
response to the potential gains. On the contrary, there was weaker functional connectivity 
between the two in response to the potential gains when loss neutral was promoted in a 
context. This suggests that relaxing the value system’s response toward the potential 
gains from the cognitive control system is necessary for learning to take riskier choices. 
This account has been verified with our finding that the vmPFC became more sensitive 
toward the potential gains in the loss neutral context after the training. Our findings 
together suggest that future research on loss aversion should take a “loss neutral” 
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perspective. In addition to studying why people are more sensitive toward the potential 
losses, it also will be fruitful to examine why people are less sensitive toward the 
potential gains. Our finding implies that it may because the value system is normally 
inhibited by the cognitive control system. 
 
Furthermore, our finding implies that cognitive control system may play extra 
role in decision-making under risk according to the current decision context. We found 
that during the probe, the activation in the supplementary motor and the parietal cortices 
was stronger toward the potential losses in the risky context than in the conservative 
context. Recent findings showed that the activation pattern in these brain regions could be 
used to predict whether a risky or a safe choice would be made subsequently after the risk 
level in a decision context increased (Helfinstein	et	al.,	2014). Taken together, these 
imply that becoming more sensitive toward the potential losses in a risky decision context 
might facilitate the cognitive control system to execute a safe choice subsequently. 
Unfortunately, we could not examine this hypothesis further since our task did not require 
the participants to make sequential decisions about risk taking. We leave the relationship 
between processing potential losses and determining the time when a safe choice should 
be executed for future studies. 
 
One may suspect that our findings may not actually speak to the core of loss 
aversion since in our task, the participants decided “for others” rather than “for 
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themselves”. This seems to be a valid point at the first glance since it has been shown that 
people make different choices when the perspective shifts (Sokol-Hessner	et	al.,	2009). 
If this account applies, we should observe that the participants’ sensitivities toward the 
potential gains and the potential losses in the first run (when they just changed the 
“perspective”) should be different from the baseline session when they decided for 
themselves. However, we found that the loss aversion was almost the same as in the 
baseline in either context of the first run (Figure 7B). This suggests that our participants 
reacted similarly as deciding for themselves even though the perspective changed. Our 
findings simply demonstrated the mechanism underlying daily situations regarding how 
decision-making under risk could be modulated by decision contexts. The question 
regarding how this experience influenced individuals’ own loss aversion is beyond the 
scope of our study. This interesting question is awaited for future exploration. 
 
In conclusion, we have shown that loss aversion can be neutralized through 
increasing the sensitivity toward the potential gains in response to the environmental 
demands. This can be achieved by releasing the value system from being suppressed by 
the cognitive control system when evaluating the potential gains during the training. As a 
result, when probed, the value system activates more strongly toward the potential gains 
in the loss neutral than in the conservative context. These point out the important but 
often overlooked interaction between cognitive control and evaluation in decision-
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making under risk and offer insights onto how investors may refine their decision-making 
process to avoid being derailed from their financial plans owning to loss aversion. 
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Chapter 3: Modeling the decision-making process of financial choices 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial decisions can be made in very short period of time. For instance, a 
trader has to decide whether to buy or sell a share in response to a sudden change in the 
financial markets. Some of these fast decision making processes may not be captured by 
the BOLD signals measured with functional MRI. In order to better understand the 
decision making process, we used mathematical models to decompose the choice and 
response time data into important psychological factors underlying the decision-making 
processes in this chapter.  
 
The decision-making process underlying binary choices can be modeled as a 
drift-diffusion process (Ratcliff,	1976). This model assumed that during the deliberation, 
a decision maker constantly accumulates noisy evidence that supports one of two possible 
choices. A decision is made once the accumulated evidence reaches a predetermined 
level, or decision bound. Three parameters control this evidence accumulation process. 
The drift rate determines the speed of evidence accumulation. The starting point indicates 
the decision maker’s initial preference for either choice. The drift variance reflects the 
noise level of this accumulation process. 
 
This model has been successfully applied to account for behavioral and neural 
activities data in different domains of decision-making. Especially, when applied to 
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value-based choices, it can capture the evaluation of costs and benefits (Basten,	Biele,	&	Heekeren,	2010) and the attention weights that decision makers put on different 
attributes of the target as they browse at each alternative (Krajbich	&	Rangel,	2011;	Krajbich,	Armel,	&	Rangel,	2010;	Krajbich,	Lu,	Camerer,	&	Rangel,	2012). Here, we 
applied the drift-diffusion model to identify which of the psychological factors in 
decision-making under risk can be shaped by experiences from trial to trial. To achieve 
this goal, we adapted a novel method for estimating parameters in drift-diffusion models 
in contrast to the traditional simulation-based fitting routine. First, the usage of analytical 
solutions for modeling the joint distribution of choice and reaction time were proposed 
and validated in this Chapter. This method then was applied to the empirical data in order 
to identify the psychological factors that account for the changes in decision-making 
under risk. Finally, we discuss the implementation of loss aversion in the drift-diffusion 
model framework and the potential extension of this modeling approach with learning 
algorithms that potentially could uncover the feedback-driven learning processes from 
trial to trial.  
METHODS 
We applied the drift-diffusion modeling approach to the behavioral data 
obtained from the previous chapter. The details of this dataset, such as sample size, data 
collection, and the experimental procedures, were described in the Methods section in the 
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previous chapter. Here, we focused on our implementation of the drift-diffusion model to 
this dataset. 
Model assumptions and parameterization 
We first assumed that the evidence driving the choices in our task was the gains-
to-losses ratio in our experiment. For each run and each context, we binned all the stimuli 
into 6 different levels according to the ratio between the gains and losses magnitudes (the 
range of the gain-to-loss ratio in each bin: .52–.79, .88–1.07, 1.18 – 1.8, 2.1–2.41, 2.59–
3.17, 3.21–6.33). Each level hence provided different strengths of evidence to support 
either rejecting or accepting the potential outcomes. For each run, we used distinct drift 
rate (μij) to model the different speed of evidence accumulation driven by the gain-to-loss 
ratio at each level (i) in each decision context (j). In addition, we also tested the other 
assumption that the drift rate could be the subjective value that was the weighted sum of 
the potential gains (𝑥!"#$%) and the potential losses (−𝑥!"##) on each trial according to the 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992): µ! =  𝑥!"#$! −  𝜆 ∗  (−𝑥!"##)! , 
where the 𝜆 indicated the amount of loss aversion. 
 
We further assumed that in each decision context within each run, this evidence 
accumulation process was perturbed by Gaussian random noise of constant magnitude 
(σj). Moreover, this process also was susceptible to initial preferences for either option in 
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each decision context (x0j) that was independent of the evidence. The required amount of 
evidence, or decision bounds, were fixed as 1 or -1 respectively for the choice of 
acceptance or rejection. The non-decision time (τj) associated with perceptual and motor 
processes also was included in the model for each decision context within each run. 
Joint distribution of choice and response time 
Given the Gaussian random noise assumption, the duration for accumulating 
evidence toward one of the decision bound, or reaction time (x), followed inverse 
Gaussian distribution: 
𝑓 𝑥 𝑎, 𝜆) =  !!!!! ! ! ∗ exp !!(!!!)!!!!!                          (5) 
At the ith gain-to-loss level, the drift rate (𝜇!) and the distance between the 
starting point and one of the decision bounds (|(±1− 𝑥!)|) determined the mean of the 
reaction time distribution:  𝑎 = !"#(±!!!!)!! .                                           (6) 
The square of this distance together with the variance of the drift determined the 
spread of the reaction time distribution: 
𝜆 = !"#(±!!!!)! !.                                        (7) 
With the same assumption, the probability of reaching the lower bound was (Ratcliff,	1976): 
P(choice = reject) = 𝑒!(!∗!!/!) −  𝑒!(!∗ !!!!! /!) 𝑒!(!∗!!/!) −  1 .  (8) 
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We also assumed that the choice and the reaction time were independent. The 
product of the two distributions therefore became the joint distribution of choice and 
reaction time. Given the set of parameter (𝑥!, 𝜇! ,𝜎, 𝜏), this joint distribution was: 𝑝 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑥  𝑥!, 𝜇! ,𝜎, 𝜏) = 𝑝 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒|𝑥!, 𝜇! ,𝜎, 𝜏 ∗ 𝑓 𝑥 𝑥!, 𝜇! ,𝜎, 𝜏 . (9) 
Parameter estimation 
Given a set of parameters (Θ={𝑥!, 𝜇! ,𝜎, 𝜏}), the likelihood function for getting 
the observed choice and response time over n trials (t: trial number) was: 𝐿 Θ 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒! , 𝑥!) = 𝑝(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒! , 𝑥!|Θ)!!!!                     (10) 
The maximum likelihood method was used for parameter estimation. We used 
the fmin function in the scipy optimize package 
(http://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy/reference/generated/scipy.optimize.fmin.html#scipy.opti
mize.fmin) to search for the parameters that minimized the negative sum of the logarithm 
likelihood function for the obtained data. 
Model validation 
This analytical solution to choice and reaction time distribution was validated in 
two folds. First, the joint distribution from analytical solution was plotted against that 
derived from simulating 5000 Weiner (drift-diffusion) processes. Second, we used 
convergence test to evaluate how well our maximum likelihood fitting routine would 
recover the true parameters as the sample size increased. For conducting this test, we 
independently simulated 100, 500, 1000, 2500, and 5000 data points from the Weiner 
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processes. The parameters used for the simulation (true parameters) were entered as 
initial guess in the gradient descent parameter estimation algorithm in the scipy optimize 
package (fmin). This simulation-and-fit process was repeated 100 times for each sample 
size and four different sets of true paramters. The mean square errors between the true 
and the best-fit parameters were computed and then averaged over the 100 iterations as 
the indicator of convergence for each parameter set.  
RESULTS 
Analytical joint distribution can be used to fit drift-diffusion model 
The visual comparison between the analytical and the empirical joint 
distributions are shown in the left panel of Figure 13. This comparison has been done 
using four different sets of parameters (Figure 13A – D, left panel). The empirical joint 
distribution (black and red dots) was derived from 5,000 data points simulated with each 
of the four sets of parameters. Each of the analytical joint distributions (black and red 
lines) was a result of entering the parameters into Equation 9. Generally speaking, the 
empirical and analytical joint distributions aligned well regardless of the different sets of 
parameters. However, they started to misalign when the sign of the starting point (𝑥!) 
and the drift rate (𝜇!) were different (Figure 13D, left panel). Specifically, the analytical 
distribution did not perfectly match the shape of the joint distribution for the processes 
ending at the lower bound. This may reflect the fact that the inverse Gaussian distribution 
is limited to the case when the drift rate and decision bound are both positive. When we 
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applied the inverse Gaussian distribution to the negative drift rate and decision bound, we 
forced them to be positive by taking absolute value. This procedure inevitably decoupled 
the correlation between processes ending in either bound when there was bias in the 
starting point. 
 
Although this caveat existed, the maximum likelihood procedure combined with 
the analytical joint distributions still could recover the true parameters as the sample size 
increased. For each set of parameters, the convergence tests were conducted by 
comparing the best-fit parameters estimated from five different sample sizes (n = 100, 
500, 1000, 2500, and 5000) using the mean square errors. As shown in the right panel of 
Figure 13, as the sample size increased, the errors between the estimated and the true 
parameters approached zero, indicating the convergence. 
Gain-to-loss ratio is the evidence driving a choice  
This drift diffusion model was applied to analyze the data in two different ways 
to test the how the potential gains and losses were transformed into the evidence during 
the decision-making process. The first model assumed that the ratio between the potential 
gains and losses might be the evidence determining the choice. The magnitudes of this 
evidence then were enhanced or reduced according to whether a risky or conservative 
choice was reinforced in a certain context. The second model assumed that the objective 
magnitudes of the potential gains and losses first transformed into subjective value (Kahneman	&	Tversky,	1979;	Tversky	&	Kahneman,	1992), depending on each 
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individual’s sensitivity toward gains and losses, which became the evidence driving a 
choice. These two assumptions were tested using model comparison. As shown in Table 
5, we found that the model using the six levels of gain-to-loss ratio as the evidence for 
making a choice fit the obtained data better than the one calculating the subjective value. 
Overall, this best-fit model could account for 62% of the variance in the choice and 67% 
of the variance in response time over the experiment. This amount of variance in choices 
and response time that could be accounted for by this model was shown in each context 
and training runs in Figure 14.   
The effect of experience on the decision-making process 
The parameter estimation from the best-fit model is plotted according to the two 
different contexts over the five training runs to illustrate the effect of experiences (Figure 
15). The drift rates showed the major differences between the two decision contexts over 
the five training runs. This interaction between the decision contexts and the training runs 
was significant at the levels where the gain-to-losses ratio was close to the acceptance 
criterion in each decision context (gray dashed lines). For instance, the drift rate of those 
originally unattractive (gain-to-loss ratio = .88–1.07, the 2nd level on the axis of Figure 
15A) or indifference stocks (gain-to-loss ratio = 1.18 – 1.8, the 3rd level on the axis of 
Figure 15A) gradually became positive (more attractive to the participants) in the risky 
context, whereas the drift rate of the same stocks progressively turned negative in the 
conservative context (interaction effects on the 2nd level: F(4,484) = 3.31, p=.01 < α 
= .05; on the 3rd level: F(4, 484) = 14.31, p<.0001). The training experience also 
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enhanced the attraction of an originally good financial offer (gain-to-loss ratio = 2.59–
3.17, the 5th level o the axis of Figure 15A) in the risky context but reduced that in the 
conservative context (interaction effect on the 5th level: F(4, 484) = 2.47, p = .04 < α 
= .05). 
 
One might suspect that training may increase the signal-to-noise ratio by 
reducing the noises in the evidence accumulation process that can be quantified as the 
drift variance. However, as shown in Figure 15D, we found that the drift variance 
remained constant over the five training runs (F(4, 484) = 1.9745, p = 0.10 > α = .05) and 
the two conditions (F(1, 484) = 0.4497, p = .51 > α = .05). The interaction between 
decision context and run was also not significant (F(4, 484) = 1.2609, p = .29 > α = .05). 
 
We found that people tended to accept the stock regardless of the magnitudes of 
the potential gains and the potential losses. This can be seen from Figure 15B that the 
overall starting-point is greater than zero. There was also significant main effect on such 
bias across the two decision contexts (F(1, 484) = 39.31, p<.0001). The tendency to 
accept a stock was greater in the conservative context than that in the risky context. 
However, this tendency to accept the stock went down over the training runs (main effect 
on runs: F(4, 484) = 2.78, p = .026 > α = .05). There was no significant interaction 
between the decision context and the training runs (F(4, 484) = 1.728, p = .1425 > α 
= .05), suggesting that this bias was not a result of training. 
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Finally, the non-decision time became shorter over the training (Figure 15C). 
The main effect on run was significant (F(4, 484) = 2.51, p = .04 < α = .05). There was 
no significant effect on the interaction between decision context and run (F(4, 484) = .83, 
p = 0.5012 > α = .05) nor the main effect on the decision context (F(1, 484) = 1.18, p = 
0.2785 > α = .05). 
DISCUSSION 
The influences of experience on the decision-making under risk were identified 
using the drift-diffusion model to complement the limited temporal resolution of the 
BOLD signals in functional neural imaging. We showed that the parameters in this model 
could be estimated more efficiently and flexibly with analytically derived joint 
distribution of choice and response time. The ratio between the potential gains and the 
potential losses rather than the subjective value computed from prospect theory better 
accounted for the evidence that drove decisions in our sample. Also, the magnitude of 
this decision evidence was modulated by the reinforcement in each decision context. This 
was shown as the effects of interaction between the decision contexts and the training 
runs on the drift rates. However, the drift variance remained constant over the training in 
both decision contexts, suggesting that the noises perturbing the evidence accumulation 
process remained the same. Finally, the non-decision time decreased over the training, 
indicating overall improvement of perceptual and motor processing in the task. 
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The finding that the evidence driving decisions about accepting or rejecting a 
potential financial outcome was better described as the gain-to-loss ratio suggests that 
financial decisions can be made by simplified the features of each option. It has been 
suggested that when choosing from multiple alternatives defined by two dimensions (e.g. 
considering the price and fuel economics when buying a car), people constantly switch 
attention across one of the dimensions and compare all the options alone this currently 
attended dimension at a time (Tversky,	1972;	Usher	&	McClelland,	2004). For each 
option on this attended dimension, the negative difference across all the options would be 
weighted greater than the positive difference, indicating the loss aversion (Kahneman	&	Tversky,	1979;	Tversky	&	Kahneman,	1992). All the different scores then were 
summed across all dimensions to derive the evidence supporting each alternative. Instead 
of switch between the dimensions for consideration, we found that people may use a 
linear combination to reduce the two dimensions into one and compare the options alone 
this new dimension (e.g. gain-to-loss ratio) in order to derive evidence supporting a 
choice. Furthermore, the weights for reducing two dimensions into one can be shaped by 
experiences in the current decision context. Our finding hence highlights the need to 
investigate the generation of heuristic strategies (e.g. dimension reduction) and its 
influences on the neural system in decision-making under risk. 
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The driving force underlying the changes in decision-making under risk is of 
great interest. This learning process may be similar to learning a rule to classify objects 
that required working memory to verbalize the rule (accepting that offer if the gains are x 
times greater than the losses) and test hypotheses. Such learning relies the frontal-
striatum loop in the brain (Ashby	&	Maddox,	2005). However, this idea may not apply 
according to the results from the previous chapter: we only observed the activation in 
frontal lobe but not the striatum during the training and the probe. Alternatively, this 
learning process may be similar to the prediction-error-driven reinforcement learning 
mechanism (Schultz,	1998;	Sutton	&	Barto,	1998). We have built the groundwork for 
testing this hypothesis. By showing that parameters in drift-diffusion model can be 
accurately estimated using analytical solutions, this approach can be combined with 
learning algorithms to estimate the cross-correlation between the feedback and the next 
choice. Unfortunately, deriving the detailed learning algorithms is beyond the timeline of 
the dissertation; hence, we left it to future study. 
 
One may criticize that our modeling approach may ignore an important factor 
that participants may trade off speed and accuracy over the training. For instance, 
findings in lexical categorization (word vs. non-word) showed that over the training, the 
decision boundaries in the drift-diffusion process decreased. This suggested that 
experiences in two-alternative categorization made people became less cautious in 
making a choice (Dutilh,	Krypotos,	&	Wagenmakers,	2011). However, in our study, we 
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fixed the height of the decision boundaries when applying the analytical solution to the 
drift-diffusion model in order to constrain the parameter estimation. This is an inevitable 
caveat of our approach.   
 
In conclusion, we found that applying rules can better account for the decision-
making process when people learned to make risker or more conservative financial 
choices over experiences. We also showed that parameters in drift-diffusion model could 
be estimated more efficiently with analytical solutions. This opened the potential to apply 
drift diffusion model to cases where trial-by-trial differences were important in decision-
making.  
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Conclusions 
Through tracking how bias could be developed in perceptual and financial decisions, I 
presented evidence suggesting an integrated picture of a domain general decision-making 
system in the human brains. The core brain structures of this system were the frontal and 
parietal cortices. The major role of this system was constantly associating decision 
contexts and reward feedback in order to learn how objective evidence (e.g. visual 
stimulus in perceptual decisions, magnitudes of costs and benefits financial decisions) 
should be evaluated. Decision bias hence occurred when this system altered its strengths 
of link between the functionally specialized brain areas that processed the evidence under 
consideration based on the current decision context. For instance, the functional 
connectivity among the frontal, visual, and value systems increased as people developed 
the tendency to make a perceptual choice according to the reward magnitudes in the 
decision context rather than abide by the perceptual evidence presented in front of them. 
Moreover, when people were encouraged to make risky or conservative financial choices 
according to the decision context, the frontal cortex gauged its functional connectivity 
between the value systems to determine the weights of the potential gains in a financial 
choice. Results from analyzing the representation of this decision evidence with a 
mathematical model suggested that this system might further synthesize experiences in 
complicated choices (e.g. costs and benefits) into rules of thumb in each decision context. 
These findings highlight the importance of integrating domain-specific knowledge in 
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decision neuroscience into a whole and provide insights into how our decision-making 
processes could be refined in the face of experiences. 
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Table 1. Best-fitting parameter estimates in the study of Chapter 1 
Parameters Learning Model I 
(contextual action-
outcome 
association) 
Learning Model II  
(action-outcome 
association)  
Hierarchical logistic 
regression (context  
by run number 
interaction) 𝑏! .81 (.39, 1.23) 1.03 (.01, 1.44) -- 𝛼 .02 (.009, .03) .01 (.006, .02) -- 𝑏! 4.01 (3.54, 4.80) 3.54 (2.47, 4.11) -- 
AIC 6672.9 7770.24 6962 
N(fit)/N(total) 21/23 2/23 -- 
Notes. The parameter values are shown as median and the interquartile range (25th, 
75th percentile) across participants. Also shown are the proportions of participants 
whose data are better fit by each of the learning model. Bold fonts: the best-fit model. 
N: the number of participants, AIC: Akaike’s Information Criterion. 
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Table 2. GLM results in the Chapter 1 
Effect Brain regions 
Cluster 
size 
(voxels) p-value z-value MNI coordinates 
     X Y Z 
Acquired bias Frontal Orbital Cortex 1336 <.0001 4.13 46 20 -12 
 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 949 <.0001 3.37 0 34 50 
 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 766 <.0001 3.77 -54 24 12 
 
Posterior Supramarginal Gyrus 729 <.0001 3.98 -52 -46 10 
 
Superior Lateral Occipital Cortex 692 <.0001 3.48 -12 -84 38 
 
Posterior Middle Temporal Gyrus 364 <.0001 3.25 62 -30 -16 
 
Postcentral Gyrus 262 <.0001 3.55 2 -34 52 
 
Brain-Stem 237 <.0001 3.89 14 -22 -14 
 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 167 <.0001 3.13 38 0 64 
 
Precentral Gyrus 163 <.0001 3.17 44 0 34 
 
Frontal Medial Cortex 105 0.005 2.95 0 46 2 
 
Posterior Superior Temporal Gyrus 100 0.007 3.16 58 -34 4 
 
Frontal Pole 94 0.011 3.40 -28 52 34 
 
Temporal Pole 91 0.014 3.26 -54 4 -24 
Contextual RPE Superior Lateral Occipital Cortex 3635 <.0001 4.28 50 -62 24 
 
Posterior Supramarginal Gyrus 1596 <.0001 4.39 -50 -48 52 
 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 1395 <.0001 4.26 -16 18 52 
 
Posterior Middle Temporal Gyrus 1189 <.0001 4.26 -62 -40 -8 
 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 1134 <.0001 3.69 38 26 52 
 
Frontal Medial Cortex 1065 <.0001 4.43 2 44 -4 
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Table	2.	(Cont.) 
Effect Brain regions 
Cluster 
size 
(voxels) p-value z-value MNI coordinates 
     X Y Z 
 Posterior Cingulate Gyrus 1063 <.0001 3.80 0 -36 42 
 
Frontal Pole 443 <.0001 3.58 50 44 20 
 
Inferior Lateral Occipital Cortex  308 <.0001 3.15 42 -78 -2 
 
Right Caudate 270 <.0001 4.42 12 12 4 
 
Cerebellum 234 <.0001 4.15 -40 -68 -38 
 
Frontal Pole 194 <.0001 3.85 -20 36 -16 
 
Left Caudate/Accumbens 170 <.0001 4.01 -10 10 0 
 
Frontal Orbital Cortex 100 0.002 3.39 -26 22 -20 
 
Anterior parahippocampal Gyrus,  67 0.037 3.37 20 -2 -26 
Context-free RPE Occipital Pole 179 <.0001 3.49 28 -96 16 
 
Pre-central Gyrus 101 0.002 3.28 -48 -18 52 
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Table 3. PPI results in the Chapter 1 
Seed regions Co-activating brain regions 
Cluster 
size 
(voxels) p-value z-value MNI coordinates 
     X Y Z 
vmPFC Pre-central Gyrus 56 0.037 3.44 -36 -30 68 
Frontal cortex 
(Left) Occipital Pole 325 <.0001 3.27 22 -92 -2 
 
Paracingulate Gyrus 131 <.0001 3.42 0 54 16 
 
Frontal Medial Cortex 117 <.0001 3.24 -4 38 -20 
 
Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 90 0.003 3.10 -48 -70 -26 
 
Right Putamen/Caudate  63 0.039 3.09 18 16 -4 
Parietal cortex 
(Left) Anterior Cingulate Cyrus 98 0.001 3.07 10 38 6 
 
Paracingulate Gyrus 71 0.009 3.37 18 52 2 
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Table 4. FMRI results in Chapter 2: General Linear Model (Risky > Conservative). 
Variebles Location 
Cluster size 
(voxels) 
Z 
statistics P value 
MNI (mm) 
X Y Z 
Training phase (Main effect) 
Gains Frontal Pole 2699 4.12 <.0001 -22 42 52 
 Precuneous Cortex 1761 4.27 <.0001 -2 -58 30 
 Lateral Occipital Cortex 1709 4.42 <.0001 -46 -62 26 
 Frontal Pole 566 4.3 0.0018 24 44 46 
 Lateral Occipital Cortex 564 4.27 0.0018 52 -60 26 
 Inferior Temporal Gyrus 350 3.85 0.0371 -68 -30 -24 
Losses Lateral Occipital Cortex 22321 6.45 <.0001 -46 -62 24 
 Precuneous Cortex 4262 6.06 <.0001 -4 -58 34 
 Angular Gyrus 2441 5.8 <.0001 50 -56 30 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus 1411 4.93 <.0001 64 -10 -20 
Training phase (Linear trend) 
Gains Angular Gyrus (Parietal cortex) 664 4.58 .0002 46 -54 32 
 
Frontal Pole (Frontal cortex) 653 4.33 .0003 30 36 50 
 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 373 4.29 .0157 60 -8 -22 
Losses Frontal Pole (Frontal cortex) 417 4.2 .0065 30 60 12 
Probe phase 
Gains Frontal Pole (Frontal cortex) 464 3.83 .0065 28 36 40 
 
Frontal Medial Cortex (vmPFC) 404 3.81 .0154 -12 54 -4 
 
Angular Gyrus (Parietal cortex) 337 4.07 .0424 54 -48 18 
Losses Supramarginal Gyrus (Parietal cortex) 933 3.88 <.0001 56 -42 28 
 
Supplementary Motor Cortex 365 3.65 .0357 4 -2 60 
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Table 5. Functional connectivity with vmPFC (Conservative > Risky). 
Variables Location 
Cluster size 
(voxels) 
Z 
statistics P value 
MNI (mm) 
X Y Z 
Training phase (Main effects) 
Gains Middle Frontal Gyrus (Frontal cortex) 508 4.15 0.0014 -48 12 38 
 
Supramarginal Gyrus (Parietal cortex) 401 3.38 0.0076 -44 -54 44 
Training phase (Linear trend) 
Losses Superior Parietal Lobule (Parietal cortex) 1706 4.2 <.0001 0 -50 68 
 
Midbrain 408 4.35 0.0041 -6 -16 -24 
 
Angular Gyrus (Parietal cortex) 331 3.53 0.0160 44 -50 30 
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Table 6. Testing different representations of evidence in financial choices. 
Model Negative log 
likelihood 
AIC BIC Proportion of 
fit among the 
sample 
Gain-to-loss 
ratio: 6 levels 
60449 
 
67019 
 
73987 .91 
Subjective 
value function 
66818 73118 
 
79872 .95 
Notes. The bolded font indicates the model that best accounts for the obtained data. 
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Figure 1 Experimental paradigm used in Chapter 1. Each trial is composed of a 
context, motion stimulus (illustrated as white dots), and reward points. The 
number of reward points that one can earn depends on the context and the 
choice. P: probability; Δt: duration; AVG: average; s: second. 
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Figure 2 Behavioral results in Chapter 1. A) Psychometric function. The motion 
strength was plotted against the probability of choosing “up” in each context 
across the five runs (dots). This change is modeled with logit function in 
which its intercept reflects the value difference between the two motion 
directions that has been learned up to the end of each run (solid lines). The 
dashed lines are the indecision points. Motion strength: the percentage of 
coherent moving-dots; +/-: upward/downward motion. Error bars: ±1 s.e.m. 
B) The bias acquisition process. The trial numbers are plotted against the 
indecision points estimated by the reinforcement-learning model using 
individuals’ data. Solid lines: group mean. Shaded areas: ±1 s.e.m. Dashed 
lines: the end of each run. Colors: corresponding to the reward context as 
illustrated in Figure 2A. C) The autocorrelation functions. The correlation 
estimates using the residuals from the context-based learning model is 
plotted against each lag. Solid lines: group average. Dashed lines: 95% 
confidence interval of the autocorrelation estimated from a random series 
with the same number of trials (a total of 280 trials).  
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Figure 3 The acquired perceptual bias in the bran. The maps show the brain areas 
whose activation positively correlates with the amount of acquired bias on 
each trial. No brain areas negatively correlate with this signal after the 
whole-brain correction of multiple comparisons. All maps are presented at p 
< .05 whole-brain corrected using cluster-based Gaussian random field and 
overlaying on the mean anatomical images from the group of participants. 
R: right hemisphere; L: left hemisphere; Z: the MNI coordinate of the axial 
slice. 
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Figure 4 The reward prediction errors. The brain maps show the regions whose 
activation positively correlates with the two types of reward prediction error 
signals in perceptual decisions after adjusting one type over the other. All 
maps are presented at p < .05 whole-brain corrected using cluster-based 
Gaussian random field and overlaying on the mean anatomical images from 
the group of participants. Red-Yellow: context-based RPE; Blue-Light-blue: 
context-free RPE; R: right hemisphere; L: left hemisphere; Z: the MNI 
coordinate of the axial slice. 
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Figure 5 Three functional connectivity patterns underlying the growth of perceptual 
bias. The left panel shows the seed regions that were used in the 
psychophysiological interaction analyses. These seed regions were selected 
according to the literature and centered at the MNI coordinates (vmPFC: [-6, 
39, -8]; left-frontal: [-45, 21, 0]; left-parietal: [-36, -39, 45]) with the radius 
of 10 mm. The brain maps on the right panel show the areas that positive 
correlate with the interaction between each of the seed regions and the 
amount of acquired bias on each trial. The statistical maps are corrected for 
multiple comparisons at the whole-brain level using cluster-based Gaussian 
random field correction at P < 0.05 and overlaying on the mean anatomical 
images from the group of participants. R: right hemisphere; L: left 
hemisphere; X, Y, Z: the MNI coordinates. 
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Figure 6 Behavioral paradigms used in Chapter 2. Left panel: The timeline of each 
event in the three phases of the experiment. Right panel: The ranges of the 
potential gains and the potential losses. In the baseline and probe phase, all 
the tested pairs of the potential gains and losses are shown as the grids. In 
the training phase, the tested pairs in each decision context are shown as the 
open circles. The blue and the yellow shaded areas show those pairs that 
should be accepted according to the decision criterion of each context. 
Those pairs fall in the gray shaded area should be rejected. ΔT: duration; s: 
seconds. 
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Figure 7 Changes in behavioral loss aversion. A) The probability of accepting a stock 
at each level of gain-to-loss ratio is gradually modulated by the decision 
contexts. The progression of training runs is shown as the gradient from 
light to dark colors. The ranges of the gain-to-loss ratio at each level, from 
the level-1 to the level-6, are .52–.79, .88–1.07, 1.18 – 1.8, 2.1–2.41, 2.59–
3.17, 3.21–6.33. Dashed gray line: indecision points. B) The measurements 
of loss aversion over the three phases of the experiment. Top panel: The 
sensitivities toward the potential gains and the potential losses in the two 
decision contexts. Bottom panel: The loss aversion indicators in the two 
decision contexts. Black dashed line: the decision criterion in each context; 
Solid dots: group average; Error bars: ±1 standard error of the group 
average. 
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Figure 8 Choice and response time in the baseline and probe phases. A) Baseline. B) 
The loss neutral (risky) context of the probe. People should accept the stocks 
as long as the potential gains are 1.12 times greater than the potential losses. 
C) The loss averse (conservative) context of the probe. People should accept 
the stocks when the potential gains are at least 2.5 times greater than the 
potential losses. P(accept): Probability of acceptance. 
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Figure 9 FMRI results in the baseline phase. Brain regions positively correlated with 
the potential gains but negatively correlated with the potential losses during 
the baseline phase. Notice that the real values of the potential losses were 
used in the design matrix; therefore, positive sign of the z-value indicates 
negative correlation. The brain map of the potential gains is presented at p 
< .05 whole-brain corrected using cluster-based Gaussian random field. The 
brain map of the potential losses is uncorrected. L: left hemisphere; Y: the 
MNI coordinates. 
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Figure 10 Training effect on brain responses (Risky – Conservative). A) Main effect. 
Brain areas showed greater responses toward the potential outcomes in the 
risky than in the conservative context. B) Linear trends. Brain areas 
gradually show greater responses toward the potential outcomes in the risky 
than that in the conservative context. C) The plots of the peak response areas 
shown in (B) against the five training runs. Red shaded plots: responses 
toward the potential gains; blue shaded plot: responses toward the potential 
losses; red solid lines and dots: group averaged response in the conservative 
context; blue solid lines and dots: group averaged in the risky context; solid 
dots: group average; error bars: ±1 standard errors. Left: left hemisphere; 
Right: right hemisphere; Y, Z: the MNI coordinates. All the brain maps are 
presented at p < .05 whole-brain corrected using cluster-based Gaussian 
random field.  
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Figure 11 Training effect on the functional connectivity with the vmPFC 
(Conservative - risky). A) Brain areas show greater functional connectivity 
between the vmPFC over the training when participants evaluated the 
potential gains (red-yellow) or the potential losses (blue-light blue). The 
map is presented at p < .05 whole-brain corrected using cluster-based 
Gaussian random field. Left or right: left or right hemisphere. B) The plots 
of the responses of the peak voxel within each cluster in (A) against the five 
training runs. Red shaded plots: the responses toward the potential gains; 
blue shaded plot: the responses toward the potential losses; red solid lines 
and dots: measured in the conservative context; blue solid lines and dots: 
measured in the risky context; solid dots: group average; error bars: ±1 of 
the standard errors.  
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Figure 12 Brain activation in the probe phase (Risky - conservative).  Brain areas 
show greater responses toward the potential gain (red-yellow) or the 
potential losses (blue-light blue) in the risky than that in the conservative 
context when probed after the training. All the maps are presented at p < .05 
whole-brain corrected using cluster-based Gaussian random field. Y, Z: the 
MNI coordinates; Left or right: left or right hemisphere. 
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Figure 13. Convergence test results. A) – D): Results from four different parameter 
sets. The left panel shows the comparison of choice and response time joint 
distribution between the simulation and analytical solution. Red: response 
time ending at the upper bound; black: response time ending at the lower 
bound; dots: simulation results; lines: analytical solutions. The right panel 
plots the sample size used in the simulation against the mean square errors 
between the true and best-fit parameters. 𝜎!: drift variance; 𝜇: drift rate; 𝑥!: starting point; 𝜏: non-decision time. 
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Figure 14. The comparison between the model and the data. The empirical and model 
derived choice accuracy and response time are plotted against each other 
together with the corresponding Spearman correlation and R2 indicating the 
goodness of fit in each context and training run. The black line shows the 
cases of perfect model fit. Blue dots and font color: risky context; red dots 
and font color: conservative context. 
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Figure 15. Parameter estimation from the drift-diffusion model. A) The drift rate 
estimated in the six different levels of gain-to-loss ratio. Blue gradients: 
risky context; brown gradients: conservative context; dashed line: criteria 
for acceptance in the risky (blue) and conservative (brown) context; stars: 
significant context-by-run interaction effects. B) The starting points. C) The 
non-decision time. D) The drift variance. Dots: group average; error bars: ± 
1 standard error.  
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